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I. INTRODUCTION
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)1 was decided almost a half
century ago, but there has been renewed interest in desegregation ju-
risprudence in recent years. 2 In the 1990s, the Supreme Court de-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law. Ph.D 2000, J.D.
1991, University of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1985, Swarthmore College. I wish
to thank Malcolm Feeley, Jeremy Waldron, David Levine, Steve Willborn, Bob
Schopp and members of the University of Nebraska College of Law Faculty Collo-
quium. I am also grateful for the excellent research assistance provided by Gray-
son Derrick, J.D., University of Nebraska, 2001.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (collectively referred to in this Article as Brown or Brown v. Bd. of
Educ.).
2. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID (Jack Balkin ed., 2001); Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the
de Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597
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cided a trilogy of cases, all of which dealt with standards for
terminating desegregation decrees. 3 These cases purported to expli-
cate the standards to be used by district courts in determining
whether and to what extent a desegregation order could be termi-
nated; yet, these standards continue to be difficult to interpret and
apply. At the same time, members of the Supreme Court have shown
increasing frustration with the length, complexity, and seemingly end-
less nature of these remedies.4 This raises the possibility that the
near half-century attempt to remedy the effects of de jure school segre-
gation might come to an end because the Court has finally had
enough, and not because of a consensus that the ongoing effects of seg-
regation have been substantially eliminated.5
Currently, there are well over 100 school districts in the United
States under court-ordered desegregation decrees. 6 The purpose of
desegregation was clearly remedial when the Supreme Court first
mandated it in 1954; yet, as this Article will argue, after its landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court was never clear
about what exactly was being remedied. As a result, there is no coher-
ent theory to cover the current problem of figuring out when "unitary"
status has been achieved and a district court can withdraw its super-
vision of a school district.7 The notion of unitary status is now little
more than an assertion, as opposed to a description of either a state of
affairs that must be attained or a procedure for identifying that state
of affairs. This means not only that district judges have little gui-
dance, but also that litigants and potential litigants have little ability
to predict how a district judge will rule on the issue of unitary status.8
Although the Supreme Court has insisted for nearly fifty years
that the scope of the violation in desegregation cases must determine
the scope of the remedy, it has not clearly delineated what the scope of
(1996); David I. Levine, The Chinese American Challenge to Court-Mandated
Quotas in San Francisco's Public Schools: Notes From a (Partisan) Participant-
Observor, 16 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 39 (2000); Wendy Parker, The Future of
School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000); Mark V. Tushnet,
The"We've Done Enough" Theory of School Desegregation, 39 How. L.J. 767
(1996).
3. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 121 (Thomas, J., concurring); Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467, 500-01 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
5. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 767.
6. Parker, supra note 2, at 1157.
7. See Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 123. As Wendy Parker has cogently argued, "at no
point is a court required to articulate specifically, for the benefit of the parties
and the community at large, what the remedy is seeking to achieve." Wendy
Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas
Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 555 (1999).
8. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 75 (1996).
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that violation is. Is it racial isolation? Is it stigma? Is it the provision
of unequal educational opportunity? Or is it, as some have argued,
the opportunities lost without the networking support of a white com-
munity?9 The Court's ambivalence about what harm desegregation
was actually remedying doomed desegregation by exposing it to future
claims of illegal affirmative action.1 0 Put another way, if the Court
cannot articulate the purpose of desegregation and what it is intended
to remedy, then trial court judges do not have the necessary informa-
tion to know when the remedy is achieved and termination is appro-
priate. Nor can they properly judge whether any particular program,
whether court-ordered or voluntary, is properly remedial or still based
on an illegal classification of race. As it stands now, the Supreme
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, and the presumption of inva-
lidity that accompanies the application of strict scrutiny, tends to tilt
the balance against desegregation programs. One way to approach
this conundrum is to argue, as many have, that diversity is a compel-
ling state interest."' Another way is to try to refine what we mean by
remedial in the context of desegregation by more carefully and specifi-
cally articulating what exactly the relevant, remediable effects of seg-
regation are or ought to be. 12 This Article adopts the latter approach.
There are two ways in which desegregation efforts are currently
being challenged in the courts that raise this remedial conundrum. In
some cases, either parents or school districts themselves petition the
court for termination of existing court-ordered desegregation decrees
on the grounds that the remedy has been completed and the district
9. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, or School
Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1118 (1996)
("[D]esegregation cases have long since passed the point where they can usefully
be described as remedial.").
11. See Stephanie E. Straub, The Wisdom and Constitutionality of Race-Based Deci-
sion-Making in Higher Education Admission Programs: A Critical Look at Hop-
wood v. Texas, 48 CASE W. RES. L REV. 133 (1997); Joanna R. Zahler, Lessons in
Humanity: Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in Public Education, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 995 (1999); Jeffrey D. Grossett, Note, Upholding Racial Diversity in the
Classroom as a Compelling Interest, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 339 (2001); Ryan
James Hagemann, Comment, Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in Higher
Education: Does Bakke Survive Affirmative Action Jurisprudence?, 79 OR. L.
REV. 493 (2000); Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Pro-
grams in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARv. L. REV. 940
(1999); cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The problem
with this approach is that it also requires a showing that the use of racial classifi-
cations is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. This second prong
of the strict scrutiny analysis is also subject to searching judicial review. See
Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 807-08 (lst Cir. 1998).
12. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits on Judicial Power in Ordering Remedies,
14 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 103, 111 (1991) ("[Tlhe choice of remedy follows from
the choice of objective. That choice is substantive.").
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has achieved "unitary status."13 In order to demonstrate unitary sta-
tus, the petitioning party has to demonstrate that "the vestiges of
[segregation] ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable,"14 and
that the school board has demonstrated good faith compliance with
the desegregation decree.15 The primary issue in these cases is identi-
fying whether any vestiges of segregation remain and whether a
school district has achieved "unitary" status. 16
In the other cases, plaintiffs claim that voluntary efforts to deseg-
regate school districts-efforts which often have their origin in poli-
cies developed while the district was under a desegregation order and
then continued after termination of the order-are unconstitutional
because they involve the State in making classifications based on race.
A number of these types of cases have been brought by children who
were unable to get into the public schools of their choice, usually mag-
net or other special public schools, because of continuing desegrega-
tion policies in their school districts.17 These cases have heralded the
convergence of desegregation jurisprudence with affirmative action ju-
risprudence.' 8 Because judges, following the Supreme Court's current
standard for reviewing governmental use of racial classifications (in
the absence of a court order), are required to apply strict scrutiny to a
school district's use of race in student assignments, a district court
reviewing a voluntary plan to desegregate a public school district
must be persuaded that the racial classifications serve a compelling
state interest. As a result, in the cases where there is no ongoing de-
segregation order, the courts have grappled with the question of
13. Lockett v. Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 1997); Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155
(5th Cir. 1990); Quarles v. Oxfard Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750 (5th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Bd. of Educ., 794 F. 2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1986); Hamp-
ton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000); Davis
v. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. Mich. 2000); United States v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D. Fla. 1997);United States v. Bd. of Educ.,
1995 WL 224537 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 1995).
14. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992).
15. Id. at 492.
16. Chief Justice Rehnquist has even gone so far as to say that defining "unitary" is
not necessary. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232 (4th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1538 (2002); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd.,
195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); Wess-
mann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998); Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. City of
Savannah, 860 F. Supp. 1563 (1994); cf Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
18. See Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Pub-
lic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1999); Karey A.
Vering, Note, Voluntary Desegregation Measures Aimed at Achieving a Diverse
Student Body Lose Ground in Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998),
79 NEB. L. REV. 485 (2000).
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whether diversity can qualify as a compelling state interest. 19 The
courts which have addressed this in the context of elementary schools
have mostly taken a discrete pass, 20 although a few courts have been
receptive to the argument that diversity and racial balance are com-
pelling state interests.2 1
The Court's failure to articulate a clear standard for terminating
desegregation decrees has left each court hearing a unitary status
claim to figure out for itself what a vestige of segregation is and
whether it is still present in the school district. A recent example of
this is Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,2 2 the
Fourth Circuit's en banc review of Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg School District,23 which was the termination case that reopened
the 1971 Swann case in which the Supreme Court for the first time
approved busing as a remedy for segregation. 24 The plaintiff in Cap-
pacchione was a girl of Hispanic and Caucasian origin who was denied
admission to a magnet school on the basis of race. The magnet school
was opened by the school district without seeking court approval and
clearly used racial preferences, even quotas, in its admissions deci-
19. See Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123
(4 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
20. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 790; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 123.
21. See Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
1999); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D.
Wash. 2001). The Supreme Court, as of this writing, has not ruled definitively on
the continuing viability of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), and the question of whether diversity might be a compelling
state interest in the context of elementary and secondary education, a question
about which the federal courts are currently split. Compare Smith v. Univ. of
Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2192 (2001), and
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), with Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), Hopwood v.
Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001), and Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Supreme Court's
decisions in non-education affirmative action cases have required strict scrutiny
of government sponsored racial classifications. These cases have also established
that remedying specific, past discrimination is a compelling state interest. City
of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications based
on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead
to a politics of racial hostility."); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (noting that the Equal
Protection Clause requires "some showing of prior discrimination by the govern-
mental unit involved").
22. 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1538 (2002).
23. 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
24. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971).
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sions. 25 The plaintiff claimed that because the magnet school was not
approved by the court supervising the district's desegregation efforts,
the magnet school's admissions program was outside of the then-oper-
ating desegregation decree, and thus violated her right to equal pro-
tection. Capacchione's challenge to the admissions program at the
magnet school led to the reopening of the Swann case and the ques-
tion of whether termination of the Swann order was required. Thus,
Capacchione had two potential factual bases for her claim: that the
admissions program was beyond the scope of existing orders and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny because it was not remedial, or al-
ternatively, that the district had achieved unitary status and any con-
tinuation of racial preferences in school assignments was therefore
subject to strict scrutiny.
The district court addressed the plaintiffs claims by using what
has come to be known as the Green factors. The Green factors are six
areas that any desegregation order should address: student assign-
ments, faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities, and
facilities.26 The Capacchione court's analysis of these factors centered
on the question of racial balance (i.e., had racial balance been accom-
plished as to these factors). The question of how racial balance vindi-
cated an interest previously violated by segregation was not
addressed. The district court's analysis in Capacchione illustrates
how, in the termination cases, as in the original desegregation cases,
simplicity of the racial balance test still encourages courts to use it
without explaining how it serves to restore the plaintiffs to their right-
ful position, even while admitting, as the Capacchione judge did, that
"[a] court must constantly anchor itself in the constitutional violation
and must not get caught up in bean-counting."27 The Capacchione
court did not attempt to explain why the existence of racial balance
would vindicate the rights and interests of the victims of segregation.
Based on its analysis of the Green factors, the Capacchione court
found that the school district had complied with the court-ordered de-
segregation plan, which had been in force for almost thirty years, and
had eliminated the vestiges of discrimination to the extent practica-
ble. Having determined that the school district had achieved unitary
status, the court went on to find that the admissions program for the
magnet school could not survive strict scrutiny because, even if diver-
sity were a compelling state interest, the way in which the district
operated its magnet school admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored. 2s
25. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 287-88.
26. Id. at 243 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
27. Id. at 244.
28. Id. at 290.
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On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's rulings on the issues of unitary status and the use of strict
scrutiny in reviewing the magnet school's admissions program;29 how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit then vacated the panel opinion and subse-
quently heard the case en banc. This time, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's unitary status finding.30
The most contested portion of the district court's opinion involved
the first Green factor: whether the current racial imbalance in some of
the district's schools was a vestige of segregation or whether it was
caused by what the court viewed as independent factors, such as
changing demographics.
The panel opinion in Belk had held that the racial isolation of cer-
tain schools in the district was a vestige of segregation, thereby
preventing termination of the desegregation order:31
Uniformity in the racial composition of a given school was the hallmark of
official discrimination, "for under the former de jure regimes racial exclusion
was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by disparagement of, or
hostility towards, the disfavored race." Court-ordered desegregation was de-
signed to meet the enemy head on; the long-term stability of attempts at racial
balancing in student assignment is often seen as the most conspicuous indica-
tion of the courts' success (or lack thereof) in combating the underlying socie-
tal evil.3 2
The en banc court saw the question of the imbalanced racial composi-
tion of some of the schools differently:
Long periods of almost perfect compliance with the court's racial balance
guidelines, coupled with some imbalance in the wake of massive demographic
shifts, strongly supports the district court's finding that the present levels of
imbalance are in no way connected with the de jure segregation once practiced
in CMS [Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools].33
As to the second issue of whether the magnet school's admissions
program was unconstitutional, a majority of both the panel and en
banc courts drew a bright line distinction between school districts sub-
ject to ongoing court orders and school districts that had been declared
by a court to have achieved unitary status. In the former districts,
racial classifications in student assignments, if they were in further-
ance of desegregation, were presumptively within the scope of the
29. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2000).
30. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (en
banc).
31. Belk, 233 F.3d at 251.
32. Id. at 254 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 474 (1992)). This is an histori-
cal, not a legal argument. It simply states that fifty years ago, racial isolation
was clear evidence of racial discrimination with all its accompanying malicious
intent and effects, and then assumes that racial imbalance today has the same
causes and effects.
33. Belk, 269 F.3d at 322.
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court order and were therefore, by definition, remedial. 34 The court
distinguished those districts from districts that had never been under
court order, or had been held to have achieved unitary status. For
unitary districts, any assignments based on race would be subject to
strict scrutiny.35
Although inadequate attention has been paid to how the theoreti-
cal issues involved in equitable remedies might inform the substance
of desegregation jurisprudence, there is a noteworthy exception. One
of the most thoughtful assessments of these issues came from a vocif-
erous opponent of court-ordered institutional reform, Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas. In Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III),36 Jus-
tice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, set out his concerns about deseg-
regation remedies at some length. Although this author believes that
his analysis was fundamentally flawed, Justice Thomas placed the fo-
cus exactly where it should be by asking basic questions about the
power of the federal courts to order these remedies and the nature of
the constitutional right at stake in desegregation cases. Because
these arguments address the relevant issues in refreshingly stark lan-
guage and could form the basis for the Court's future approach to de-
segregation, they need to be evaluated. As such, this Article is
organized around the questions posed by Justice Thomas.
In Part II, this Article sets out those questions in more detail and
reviews the background debate that has dominated discussion of de-
segregation remedies up until this time. Parts III and IV explore Jus-
tice Thomas' concerns. Part III explores the history of equity in order
to understand the historical nature of the equitable power of the fed-
eral courts and how that might inform a theory of desegregation reme-
dies. Part IV discusses rights theory and how it might promote a
productive approach to understanding the nature of the constitutional
violation at issue in desegregation cases. Part V offers some conclud-
ing thoughts.
34. Id. at 307. This also contradicts some language in the district court opinion in
Capacchione which stated that, even if the district had not been ruled unitary,
the magnet school admissions program would not be presumed remedial because
the "change in the student assignment process was a material departure from the
Swann orders." Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228,
287 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
35. See Belk, 233 F. 3d at 303; Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); Tuttle
v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Wess-
mann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
36. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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II. EXPOSITION
A. Jenkins III
On June 12, 1995, the Supreme Court handed down its third opin-
ion in Missouri v. Jenkins,3 7 a case initiated in 1977 to desegregate
the Kansas City, Missouri school district. By 1995, the district court
judge supervising the case had ordered, among other remedies, over
$500 million in capital improvements and over $220 million for qual-
ity education programs for the school district.38 The goal, according to
the district court, was to increase student achievement and attract
non-minority students to the Kansas City school district.3 9 In Jenkins
III, the Supreme Court struck down aspects of the desegregation rem-
edy and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings
regarding the question of whether the State had achieved sufficient
compliance with its remedial decree such that the district court could
end its supervision of at least some aspects of the operation of the
school district and thereby "'restore state and local authorities to the
control of a school system that is operating in compliance with theConstitution.'4o
Jenkins III was greeted by many scholars and the press as signal-
ing the end for school desegregation because it accelerated the process
of limiting the scope of these remedies without offering a principled,
legal reason for limiting them.4 1 Whether or not that is true, the re-
sult was predictable because it continued the Court's modern desegre-
gation jurisprudence which places emphasis on the central importance
37. Id.
38. See Christina J. Nielsen, Missouri v. Jenkins: The Uncertain Future of School
Desegregation, 64 UMKC L. REV. 613, 616-19 (1996).
39. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
40. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 99 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)).
41. See Patricia A. Brannan, Missouri v. Jenkins: The Supreme Court Reconsiders
School Desegregation in Kansas City, Criteria for Unitary Status, and Remedies
Reaching Beyond School District Lines, 39 How. L.J. 781 (1996); Mark S. Davies,
Desegregating an Ideal: Neighborhood Schools, Urban School Systems and Mis-
souri v. Jenkins, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 89 (1995); Cheryl Fuetz, Mis-
souri v. Jenkins: The Supreme Court's Reanalysis of School Desegregation
Remedial Decrees: Is the Majority Placing Subtle Limits on the Trial Courts's Vast
Equitable Discretion? 61 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1996); Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri
v. Jenkins and the De facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71
WASH. L. REV. 597, 599 (1996); Nielsen, supra note 38, at 613; Chelsey Parkman,
Missouri v. Jenkins: The Beginning of the End for Desegregation, 27 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 715 (1996); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inher-
ent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1996); James
S. Kunen, End of Integration, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996, at 39 ("When the history of
court-ordered school desegregation is written, Kansas City may go down as its
Waterloo.").
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of local control over school districts and castigates what it character-
izes as overreaching district court judges. 42
What made Jenkins III particularly noteworthy was a concurring
opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas. In that concurrence,
Justice Thomas argued that it was time to "put the genie back in the
bottle" and return the Court's desegregation jurisprudence to first
principles.4 3 He identified three fundamental aspects of the Court's
current jurisprudence that had "gotten out of the bottle": the Court's
analysis of the constitutional violation that gives rise to a desegrega-
tion remedy, the Court's analysis of the scope and availability of de-
segregation remedies, and the capacity of the federal courts to
implement those remedies. Thomas' critique took for granted the
Court's time-honored principle that the scope of the violation deter-
mines the scope of the remedy, but he insisted that "[i]n order to eval-
uate the scope of the remedy, we must understand the scope of the
constitutional violation and the nature of the remedial powers of the
federal courts."4 4
Having identified the fundamental issues that must be addressed
in order to evaluate the propriety of a school desegregation remedy,
Justice Thomas argued that the Court's current jurisprudence was
misguided as to all three issues: First, the Court's conception of the
constitutional violation involved in desegregation cases was premised
on a theory of black inferiority; second, the Court's conception of the
remedial powers of the federal courts was not consistent with the his-
tory of the equitable powers of federal courts in the United States;
and, finally, the courts simply lacked the capacity to implement com-
plex desegregation remedies.
As to the nature of the violation with which desegregation cases
were concerned, Justice Thomas argued that it was not psychological
harm to black children that formed the basis for finding segregation
unconstitutional. Instead, Justice Thomas argued that Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown I), the 1954 Supreme Court decision find-
ing state-mandated segregation unconstitutional, established the
principle that the "government cannot discriminate among its citizens
on the basis of race" and therefore must treat its citizens as individu-
als, not as members of specific groups.4 5 It was this principle, he con-
tended, based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,46 that made segregation unconstitutional and caused
42. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433
U.S. 267 (1977).
43. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 123 (Thomas, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 114.
45. Id. at 120. This view stands in stark contrast to Justice Thurgood Marshall's
view that psychological harm is highly relevant to the constitutional violation.
46. "No State shall.., deny to any person.., the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
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the Brown I Court to conclude that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."4 7 Thus, the scope of the
violation, according to Justice Thomas, was intentional segregation by
the State in school assignments.
Justice Thomas further contended that because courts often use
racial imbalance in a school district as evidence of past intentional
segregation, even in the absence of current discrimination, they were
implicitly saying that black was inferior. 48 Thomas supported this in-
cendiary remark by noting that it was essentially impossible to prove
that intentional segregation in 1954, when Brown I was decided and
intentional segregation was outlawed, caused racial imbalance in pub-
lic schools decades later. This causation problem has been noted by
Justice Kennedy,49 among others. 50 But Justice Thomas went one
step further, stating that even if the link between intentional segrega-
tion and later racial imbalance in schools could be proven, the result-
ing racial isolation of blacks was not a harm because to say that it was
a harm was to say that blacks were inferior and needed to be mixed
with white kids in order to succeed in school. Justice Thomas insisted
that the psychological effects on black school children of being sepa-
rated from whites were irrelevant to finding a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause and only injected "the unnecessary and misleading
assistance of the social sciences" into the Court's adjudication of con-
stitutional issues. 51
By defining the violation narrowly, and refusing to acknowledge
any remediable harm to black children that resulted from that viola-
tion (or, at least, refusing to acknowledge the types of effects recog-
nized by the Brown I Court), Justice Thomas, by implication, also
limited the scope of the remedy. If there were no legally cognizable
effects on black children as a result of isolating them through segrega-
tion, and social science evidence to the contrary is "unnecessary and
misleading," then there is no need to provide a remedy for that isola-
tion, beyond simply telling the State to stop segregating by race.
In addressing the second prong of his argument about the need to
limit remedies, Justice Thomas could have simply argued that since
the right was so narrowly defined, such that there were no remediable
47. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
48. See Jenkins IIl, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It never ceases to
amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predomi-
nantly black must be inferior."); Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed
the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
6 (1992).
49. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992) (Kennedy, J.) ("It is simply not
always the case that demographic forces causing population change bear any real
and substantial relation to a de jure violation.").
50. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 7, at 519-21.
51. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 121.
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effects, then logically a very limited remedy would follow it. But Jus-
tice Thomas again went further, arguing that most desegregation
remedies were improper because they exceeded the remedial powers of
the federal courts. According to Justice Thomas, this exercise of equi-
table power was "unprecedented" (although it has now been going on
for over forty years), and the district courts have had "little regard for
the inherent limitations on their authority."52 There are, in Justice
Thomas' view, "certain things that courts, in order to remain courts,
cannot and should not do."53
Justice Thomas based this claim on an analysis of equity jurispru-
dence in the eighteenth century, citing Blackstone's view of equity and
the ratification of the United States Constitution in 1789. Justice
Thomas argued that the available evidence indicates that the Framers
of the Constitution, specifically Alexander Hamilton, intended to be-
stow equity jurisdiction on the federal courts in the same form that it
was exercised in England (i.e., as a set of particular remedies for par-
ticular claims). The key to equity at that time was that it was gov-
erned by rules and precedents that prevented judges from using
unbridled discretion to achieve particular results. Yet, even if hisbrief and selective historical discussion accurately portrays the Fram-
ers' intent, Thomas failed to take into account any effects on the equi-
table power of the federal courts that may have come about as a result
of the importation of equity into a vastly different political environ-
ment than existed in England; the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment after the Civil War; and the overhaul of federal court pro-
cedure that occurred in 1938 with the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which included the merger of law and equity.
Interestingly, and despite these shortcomings, this aspect of Jus-
tice Thomas' opinion has been hailed as both original and sophisti-
cated.54 This Article attempts to show that although it has
tremendous merit for its distillation of the critical issues, Justice
Thomas' opinion is, at best, incomplete and misleading, and at worst,just wrong.
Yet, Justice Thomas' overriding concern that judges need to have
specific and knowable limits on their powers remains valid and unan-
swered by the Court. In Justice Thomas' words: "If the standard
reduces to what one believes is a 'fair' remedy, or what vaguely ap-
52. Id. at 126. John Yoo, who was serving as Justice Thomas' law clerk at the time
Jenkins III was decided, has argued elsewhere that this issue of "institutional
authority," more than capacity, is the primary barrier to the propriety of schooldesegregation remedies. Yoo, supra note 41, at 1121.
53. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 132.
54. See, e.g., David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's
Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 340 (1996) (discuss-ing how Mayer considers Thomas "the most interesting and original Justice on
the Court").
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pears to be a good 'fit' between violation and remedy, then there is
little hope of imposing the constraints on the equity power that the
Framers envisioned and that our constitutional system requires."
5 5
As Justice Thomas suggests, if we are to understand the scope of
the equitable power of courts, we should start with an analysis of the
historical record. And if the remedy is meant to address the violation
of a particular right, then one aspect of the definition of the courts'
remedial powers must derive from the definition of the right that
those powers are exercised to vindicate.
B. Overview of Desegregation Scholarship: Discretion,
Capacity, and Legitimacy
Justice Thomas' Jenkins III concurrence can be understood as a
recent contribution to a long running debate about the general propri-
ety of institutional reform litigation. Critics have focused on various
problematic aspects of institutional reform, whether it be the capacity
of courts to implement these remedies, 56 the legitimacy of courts in
reorganizing public institutions, 57 or the general uneasiness with ju-
dicial involvement in cases that look so different from "traditional" ad-
judication. 58 What all of these critiques of the remedial process in
institutional reform litigation have in common is a fundamental con-
cern with the use of discretion by judges and an assumption that the
more principled and limited judicial discretion is, the more legitimate
judicial action is. 5 9
At the remedial stage of desegregation litigation, the primary judi-
cial principle guiding the courts is that the relief ordered must remedy
the constitutional violation. In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), the
55. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 134.
56. See infra note 58.
57. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 18 (1977); see also
William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 694 (1982) (contending that judicial dis-
cretion in institutional reform litigation is presumptively illegitimate unless
there is a "demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity of the political body" to cor-
rect the constitutional violation); Paul Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reform-
ers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 951 n.7 (1978) (suggesting a separation of
powers argument based on the structure of the Constitution).
58. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978). "[Ihe distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that
of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor." Id. at
364.
59. This proposition has been voiced by many throughout Anglo-American legal
thought. See e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Edward Fry, Life of John Selden, in TABLE
TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 177 (Frederick Pollack ed., 1927).
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Supreme Court identified three factors for the exercise of equitable
discretion: (1) "the nature of the desegregation remedy is to be deter-
mined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation"; (2) "the
decree must ... be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as
nearly as possible to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to
the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct";
and (3) the courts must "take into account the interests of state and
local authorities in managing their own affairs."60 These guidelines
have proven difficult to apply, and when appellate courts attempt to
define the limits of discretion, they often simply repeat vague, open-
ended terms, such as "fairness" and "reasonableness."61
Judge William Fletcher, when he was a law professor, argued that
for this reason remedial discretion in institutional reform litigation,
because it is "inevitably political in nature," is also "presumptively il-
legitimate."62 The illegitimacy stems from the fact that there is no
control over the judge's discretion: "The specificity of the decree and
the indeterminacy of the norms that guide its drafting make the trialjudge's remedial discretion more difficult to control, and hence more
threatening, than the discretion inherent in judicial rulemaking."63
The reason that judicial rulemaking is less threatening is that it is
formulated "according to the rules of reason and justice,"64 and once
announced it takes on a regularity whereby it is visible and applied as
a general rule until properly overruled. Judge Fletcher further noted
that "internal controls may also be lacking, for these may simply be
insufficient legal norms to guide a conscientious trial judge in the dis-
cretionary formulation of the remedy."65 Thus, the court must "rely
largely on its own ingenuity in discovering the likely consequences of
its remedial decree."66
This concern with the expansiveness of the court's power has been
voiced by many others.67 Donald Horowitz, for example, acknowl-
edged the foundation of equitable discretion in institutional reform lit-
60. 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977).
61. Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 784, 861 (1978).
62. Fletcher, supra note 57, at 637.
63. Id. at 644.
64. Id. at 643 n.29 (quoting Judge Henry Friendly, Judicial Control of Discretionary
Administrative Action, 23 J. LEGAL EDUc. 63, 64 (1970)).
65. Id. at 645.
66. Id. at 640. Paul Mishkin has argued that if a federal judge does not show extreme
restraint in institutional cases, he will be tempted to eradicate every evil he sees
in the situation, rather than being limited to remedying the violation of a particu-
lar right. Mishkin, supra note 57, at 960.
67. See, e.g., Clair A. Cripe, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: A Practitioner's
View, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION 273 (John J. Dilulio, ed.
1990); Colin Driver, The Judge as Political Power Broker, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 100
(1979).
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igation in the English tradition, 68 but argued that judges do not have
the institutional capacity to effectively exercise this discretion in the
context of the remedial stage of institutional reform litigation. 69
While those who disapprove of court involvement in institutional
remedies usually state their arguments in terms of how those reme-
dies differ from traditional legal remedies, those who approve of judi-
cial involvement in institutional reform litigation generally focus their
arguments on the aspects of institutional reform litigation that are
similar to traditional adjudication. Abram Chayes grounded his ap-
proval in the notion that the legitimacy of the judiciary depends on its
response to "the deep and durable demand for justice in our society,"
yet he noted that "the American legal tradition has always acknowl-
edged the importance of substantive results for the legitimacy and ac-
countability of judicial action."70
Owen Fiss, on the other hand, argues that the legitimacy of court
involvement in institutional reform litigation is the same as in tradi-
tional litigation: to give meaning to public values.7 ' Institutional re-
form litigation, such as school desegregation, often involves some of
the most sensitive issues of public values and is thus most appropriate
for judicial review. The legitimacy of court involvement in restructur-
ing organizations to comply with individual rights comes not from the
ultimate success of the remedy, but from the fact that in deciding
those types of cases, judges are doing what they always do: giving
meaning to public values through adjudication of claims of individual
rights. The remedy is the actualization of the right and therefore,
since both must exist in order to express a constitutional value, the
judge must not only declare the value, but oversee its implementa-
tion.7 2 In the context of institutional reform, Fiss saw a particular
necessity for judicial oversight:
In this social setting, what is needed to protect the individual is the establish-
ment of power centers equal in strength and equal in resources to the domi-
nant social actors; what is needed is countervailing power. A conception of
adjudication that strictly honors the right of each affected individual to par-
ticipate in the process seems to proclaim the importance of the individual, but
actually leaves the individual without the institutional support necessary to
realize his true self. In fact, the individual participation axiom would do little
more than throw down an impassable bar-polycentrism-to the one social pro-
cess that has emerged with promise for preserving our constitutional values
68. HOROWITZ, supra note 57, at 11-12.
69. Id. at 255-98.
70. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1316 (1976); see Abram Chayes, Foreward: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982).
71. Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 11 (1979).
72. Id.; OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 93-95 (1978).
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and the ideal of individualism in the face of the modern bureaucratic
state-structural reform. 7 3
It is noteworthy that those who contend that the courts are legiti-
mately involved in institutional reform litigation focus primarily on
the rights phase of the litigation, emphasizing that the impetus for the
court's later involvement in institutional change is individual consti-
tutional or statutory rights. By contrast, those who contend that
courts should not be involved in institutional reform litigation,
whether for capacity or legitimacy reasons, focus on the remedial
phase of the litigation, as this is where judicial involvement strays
from its traditional role.74 Critics do not suggest that substantive con-
stitutional rights should not be enforced.75 On the other hand, propo-
nents of institutional reform litigation do not come to terms with the
fact that the creation of the remedy in institutional reform litigation is
almost entirely a discretionary process. 76 Regardless of how one char-
acterizes judicial action in institutional reform litigation, the "tremen-
dous issue" of what constraints there are for judicial action remains. 77
73. Fiss, supra note 71, at 44.
74. There are some exceptions to this generalization. In Theodore Eisenberg & Ste-
phen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980), Eisenberg and Yeazell contend that the remedies
employed in institutional reform litigation are not new, but the enforcement of
the specific rights involved in this type of litigation, rights of groups and individu-
als as opposed to property rights, is novel. As such, "old remedies are implement-
ing new rights." Id. at 511. Jennifer Hochschild, on the other hand,
acknowledges the complexity and uniqueness of these cases, but argues that
courts are usually quite capable of dealing with this complexity. JENNIFER HOCH-
SCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 139-41 (1984).
75. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 74, at 487 (arguing that "if the facts estab-
lish the underlying [constitutional] claim, the burden of proof should be on those
who suggest that courts should not attempt fully to remedy the constitutional
violations."). Daryl Levinson attributes this to what he calls "rights essential-
ism": the conception of constitutional rights as entirely independent of their rem-
edies. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 933-34 (1999).
76. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 1281, 1296 (1976). One broad justification for this discretion is that
courts serve as the last resort and exercise this type of discretion only after other
branches of government have failed in their responsibilities. See, e.g., JETHRO K.
LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 143-146 (1981). The exception to this is MAL-COLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE (1998). Feeley and Rubin come to terms with this process by reconceptual-
izing the process as legitimate and rejecting as outdated and outmoded the clas-
sic arguments against it, such as federalism, separation of powers, and the rule of
law. See also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 412(1982) (contending that there are significant constraints on judges during post-
trial management because of the need to respect the defendant's interest in local
autonomy, the complexity and difficulty of micromanaging compliance, misgiv-
ings about overuse of the contempt power, and some sanguinity about the
breadth of plaintiffs requested relief).
77. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 76, at 147.
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This Article is an effort to bridge that gap by recognizing that the le-
gitimacy of the entire enterprise depends on the ability to articulate
the nature of the substantive right at stake, which in turn will deline-
ate the proper limits on the nature and scope of the remedy.
Justice Thomas' concurrence in Jenkins III contributed to this de-
bate by offering a fresh and provocative analytical approach, and he
applied this approach to the most current and vexing issue in desegre-
gation jurisprudence, the termination of longstanding decrees. Rather
than just asking whether the courts are legitimately involved in these
cases or whether they have the capacity to implement remedies, Jus-
tice Thomas broke the issue down into its component parts and in-
sisted that we ask more fundamental questions about what exactly
was being remedied in desegregation cases, and what inherent powers
the federal courts possess that permit them to provide a remedy.
Thus, Justice Thomas' opinion could be understood as an attempt to
answer Chayes' call nearly thirty years earlier for "improving the per-
formance of public law litigation ... by a more systematic professional
understanding of what is being done."7 8
The value of Justice Thomas' concurrence is that he understood
this as the key issue for the Court at this time, even though his analy-
sis of the issue fell far short of providing the necessary structure for
analysis and change. For example, Justice Thomas was correct in as-
serting that whether there was intentional segregation violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a factual question that courts are compe-
tent to answer without the help of social science evidence about the
effects of that violation on black school children. What he failed to
acknowledge was that simply identifying the violation from the per-
spective of the perpetrator does not begin to adequately address the
fundamental issue of remedy.7 9 In order to determine the scope of the
remedy, one must not only know what the violation was, but also what
the relevant effects of that violation were.8 0 The Brown I Court un-
derstood psychological damage and feelings of inferiority to be rele-
vant effects. Justice Thomas, by focusing on the violation solely from
the point of view of the State, failed to acknowledge that the effects of
78. Chayes, supra note 76, at 1313.
79. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1976); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 739 (1986); James
S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1524-32 (1990).
80. See Joondeph, supra note 41, at 71 ("[Hlarms caused by de jure segregation do
not immediately cease once a school district abandons intentional discrimina-
tion."). This analytical error will be described later in Part III as an attempt to
squeeze the complexities of the school desegregation issues into a strictly
Hohfeldian analysis, where rights and remedies are exact correlatives.
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the violation, although perhaps not relevant to identifying the viola-
tion, are key to remedying it.81
In order to address Justice Thomas' concerns, it is necessary to ex-
plore two subjects: equity and rights theory. The history of equity and
its adaptation in the United States give us clues about the power of
the courts to issue broad, complex desegregation remedies. Rights
theory helps to clarify the nature of the harm caused by the constitu-
tional violation, which then forms the basis for, and the ultimate goal
of, the remedy. Hopefully we can learn something from history and
theory that will shed light on the difficulty facing courts in terminat-
ing desegregation decrees.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF EQUITY
Equity is A Roguish thing
-John Selden82
One of the concerns raised by Justice Thomas in his Jenkins III
concurrence was that the federal courts lack the inherent authority to
order complex remedies that involve them in the reorganization of
public institutions. Justice Thomas grounded this view in a fairly
meager discussion of English equity practice and a small sampling of
political writing around the time of the ratification of the Constitu-
tion.S3 This raises a critical question, for if the current exercise of eq-
uitable power to remedy school segregation cannot be reconciled with
its history, then that would provide strong evidence for those who
view this exercise of judicial power as illegitimate. If the power to or-
der these remedies is illegitimate, then the duty to terminate them
becomes essential. This however is not the case. The historical record
teaches us that when the concept of equity was incorporated into the
Constitution, it was by necessity, though perhaps unwittingly,
reinvented to serve the needs of the new democratic polity.
Justice Thomas' concern about the lack of authority in the courts to
order these remedies reflects a concern that dates back to ancient
times. There has always been a fear that officials charged with arbi-
trating disputes would abuse their equitable discretion. Aristotle ex-
pressed concern with equitable discretion and struggled with the
problem of balancing the fairness of the general application of written
laws with the need for discretion in individual circumstances. As to
the desirability of general laws, Aristotle believed that "[tihe weighti-
est reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular
81. Cf. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Ap-
proach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001).
82. FRY, supra note 59, at 177.
83. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 126-131 (1995).
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but prospective and general," whereas individuals "will often have al-
lowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or
hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth ....
In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few
things as possible."8 4 Yet, Aristotle recognized that
the laws speak only in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances
.... Hence it is clear that a government acting according to written laws is
plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general
principle which exists in law; and this is a better ruler which is free from
passion than that in which it is innate. Whereas the law is passionless, pas-
sion must ever sway the heart of man. Yes, it may be replied, but then on the
other hand an individual will be better able to deliberate in particular
cases.
85
In the mid-seventeenth century, John Selden articulated this fear
in his now famous aphorism that equity varies like the Chancellor's
foot:
Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law wee have a measure know what to trust
too. Equity is according to [the] conscience of him [that] is Chancellor, and as
[it] is larger or narrower soe is equity Tis all one as if they should make [the]
Standard for [the] measure we call A foot, to be [the] Chancellor's foot; what
an uncertain measure would this be; One Chancellor [has] a long foot another
A short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis [the] same thing in the Chancellors
Conscience. 8 6
And yet, history also teaches us that questions delegated to equita-
ble discretion eventually, through their repeated occurrence, take on
the characteristics of legal rules and principles. What was initially a
subject matter open to discretionary treatment hardens into law to
such an extent that it becomes indistinguishable from other rules of
law that did not have origins in the principles of equity.8 7 Henry
Maine describes this "hardening" process in Roman and English law
in the following way:
[English and Roman Equity] tended, and all such systems tend, to exactly the
same state in which the old common law was when Equity first interfered
with it. A time always comes at which the moral principles originally adopted
have been carried out to all their legitimate consequences and then the system
founded on them becomes as rigid, as unexpansive, and as liable to fall behind
moral progress as the sternest code of rules avowedly legal. 8 8
84. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1354a-b (W. Ross ed. 1925),
available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.l.i.html.
85. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS III, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1199 (Richard Mc-
Keon ed., & Benjamin Jowett, trans., Random House 1941), available at http://
classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three.html; see also DAVID SCHOENBROD ET
AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 1-2 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the possible re-
medial theories supporting Hammurabi's Code and the Ten Commandments).
86. Fry, supra note 59, at 43.
87. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Foreword, 56 LAW & Contemp. Probs. 1-3
(1993).
88. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 65-66 (Frederick Pollock ed.,1906).
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Why didn't this hardening occur in the context of desegregation
cases? There are two related answers. First, equity, although largely
"hardened" into knowable rules in England at the time it was im-
ported to this country, was reinvented here and thus, to some extent,
started from scratch on new soil in the eighteenth century. Second,
there has never been a workable articulation of the goal of desegrega-
tion remedies that would allow judges, faced with either creating or
terminating a decree, a yardstick against which to measure whether
they were exercising their discretion in a principled manner.
A. English Equity
In England, equity had its origin in the King's Council. Occasion-
ally, when there was no writ to fit a petitioner's complaint, the King
and his council would decide a case rather than have his Chancellor
issue a writ to the common law court. Eventually the King's Chancel-
lor emerged as the place for extraordinary relief for those claimants
for whom the common law courts could not provide relief.
The Chancellor, who was a member of the King's Council, and, un-
til 1529, a member of the clergy, served at the pleasure of the King
and obtained his authority from the King's "reserve ofjustice."89 The
jurisdiction of the court of chancery at this time included "a general
authority to give relief in all matters of what nature soever requiring
the exercise of the Prerogative of Grace."90 Thus, the Chancellor was
not limited by specific delegation of the King's prerogative in the form
of particular writs as were the judges of the common law courts. One
could petition the Chancellor by simply writing out a bill stating one's
complaint in the vernacular without the encumbrance of specific
pleading language required by the common law courts.9 1 This general
authority given to the Chancellor was derived from the King's prerog-
ative to do justice according to the circumstances of each particular
case. As Stephen Subrin put it: "The bill in equity became the proce-
dural vehicle for the exceptional case."9 2
89. F.W. MAITLAND, EQuITY 3 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1947).
90. Id. George Spence points out, however, that at this time the Chancellor did not
have exclusive jurisdiction over matters of Grace: the Great Council (which later
became Parliament) and the Privy Council also heard such matters. George
Spence, The History of the Court of Chancery, in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 237 (1908).
91. Garrard Glenn & Kenneth R. Redden, Equity, A Visit to the Founding Fathers, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQuITY 12, 21-22 (Edward Domenic Re ed., 1955). By the
reign of Edward III in the fourteenth century, the Chancellor had jurisdiction to
decide petitions addressed to the Kings. As appeals to the King from complain-
ants too impoverished to afford to sue or fearful that a jury would be hopelessly
biased toward their wealthier, more powerful adversaries became more numer-
ous, the King delegated more authority to his Chancellor.
92. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 918 (1987).
[Vol. 81:283
2002] TERMINATION OF DESEGREGATION DECREES 303
The absence of checks on the Chancellor's discretion was a cause
for concern. George Spence notes that there was a fear that the dis-
cretion left to the Chancellor, with its decisionmaking dependent on
"Honesty, Equity, and Conscience," could destroy the rule of law if not
exercised by competent men.93 There were fears that the Chancellor's
discretion and appeal to conscience in making decisions posed a threat
to the stability of the common law. 94 This concern was echoed in the
seventeenth century by the English Whigs who viewed the Chancellor,
serving at the pleasure of the King, as "capable, under the plea that he
was promoting justice or equity, of destroying the certainty no less
than the formalism of the common law."9 5
There were a number of reasons why the exercise of the Chancel-
lor's power to decide cases and to change the outcome of cases already
decided by the common law courts might raise fears of runaway dis-
cretion. First, the Chancellor, in making a decree, acted against the
person, not in reference to a legal right (i.e., he acted in personam
rather than in rem).9 6 Thus, at least in theory, the Chancellor did not
affect or change the common law rights of litigants by deciding a case
that the common law courts would not hear, or in ordering a party
who prevailed in the common law courts not to enforce a judgment.
Rather, he simply required a certain action of a party, which did not
affect anyone else's legal rights and was not binding on anyone else in
the future. Yet in practice, the Chancellor had the power to introduce
tremendous uncertainty into common law proceedings by interfering
with the finality of common law judgments.
Second, up until the seventeenth century, neither the judgments
nor the reasoned explanations of the judgments of the court of chan-
cery were written down. Thus, each case that came before the Chan-
cellor was not in principle governed by anything the Chancellor had
done before. This arbitrariness, or appearance of arbitrariness, was
reinforced by the prevailing view that the Chancellor acted based on
93. Spence, supra note 90, at 238.
94. Id. at 236.
95. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 380
(10th ed. 1961). Of course, we must not forget Dickens' perspective:
This is the Court of Chancery; which has its decaying houses and its
blighted lands in every shire; which has its worn-out lunatic in every
madhouse, and its dead in every churchyard; which has its ruined suitor,
with his slipshod heels and threadbare dress, borrowing and begging
through the round of every man's acquaintance; which gives to monied
might, the means abundantly of wearying out the right; which so ex-
hausts finances, patience, courage, hope; so overthrows the brain and
breaks the heart; that there is not an honourable man among its practi-
tioners, who would not give-who does not often give-the warning, "Suf-
fer any wrong that can be done you, rather than come here!"
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 2-3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987) (1853).
96. Subrin, supra note 92, at 918.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
his conscience which was understood to be a reflection of universal
justice and natural law. As such, it was unknowable and
unpredictable.
This reveals the fundamental paradox in the powers of the Chan-
cellor, which led inevitably to their hardening into rules of law. The
premise of the Chancellor's power was that the universality of the law
made for individual cases where following the law would lead to an
injustice. The early Chancellors, until Sir Thomas More, were mem-
bers of the clergy and could thus appeal to higher law in applying
their conscience and the consciences of the parties to decide disputes.
The Chancellor was not reforming the law by issuing a decree that
seemed to contradict a common law precept; he was correcting the in-
justices that the application of universal rules to individual cases was
bound to produce. If the Chancellor could decide cases according to
his conscience, but was not bound to apply that conscience consist-
ently to all cases, then the exercise of power at all by the Chancellor
itself could create injustice. S.F.C. Milsom viewed this conceptual
problem as follows:
When the legal process is seen as procuring a result which reflects a single
absolute justice, it is hard to admit that a result can be properly procured and
yet be wrong. And when the legal process is seen as the application of sub-
stantive rules, it is equally hard to admit that the substantive rules, properly
applied, are somehow wrong.
9 7
Milsom argues that this "seculari[ziation of conscience made con-
flict inevitable" because it meant that one secular institution, the
chancery, was interfering with the operation of the other, the common
law courts.98
In the end, concerns that existed about the exercise of discretion by
public officials in resolving individual disputes were eventually elimi-
nated because the exercise of that discretion slowly took on the attrib-
utes of the rule of law. Around the time that there was a change from
ecclesiastical Chancellors to lawyers serving as Chancellor, which be-
gan with Sir Thomas More in 1529, the practice of writing down and
collecting both reports of decisions by the Chancellor, as well as proce-
dure, was introduced. 99 In 1617, Lord Bacon appointed a reporter to
"sit at his feet," and by 1660, reporting of chancery cases became regu-
97. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 93 (2d ed. 1981).
98. Id. at 91. Another objectionable element of the chancery interfering with com-
mon law judgments was that it cast the chancery court as an "illegitimate form of
appeal." Id. at 92. Nevertheless, there is evidence that, for the most part, even in
the early seventeenth century, the common law and equity courts were able to
coexist rather peacefully, with the interference by equity courts in the common
law judgments being more the exception than the rule.
99. Id. at 82.
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lar practice.lOO As a result, precedents became binding. As J.H.
Baker observes:
[T]he preoccupation of the court with matters of property, the high intellec-
tual capacity of the chancellors and the leaders of the Chancery Bar, and the
superior quality of the reports taken in the eighteenth century, all combined
to render equity as certain and as scientific as law. The process may even
have gone too far. Rigor aequitatis set in, and equity almost lost the ability to
discover new doctrines. 1 0 1
William Blackstone notes how this change affected the law as inter-
preted by the Chancellors:
[It] was in the infancy of our courts of equity, before their jurisdiction was
settled, and when the chancellors themselves, partly from their ignorance of
law, (being frequently bishops or statesmen), partly from ambition or lust of
power (encouraged by the arbitrary principles of the age they lived in), but
principally from the narrow and unjust decisions of the courts of law, had ar-
rogated to themselves such unlimited authority, as hath totally been dis-
claimed by their successors for now above a century past .... But the systems
of jurisprudence, in our courts both of law and equity, are now equally artifi-
cial systems, founded on the same principles of justice and positive law. 1 0 2
The clearest example of how this happened was in the law of
trusts. By the fifteenth century, the Chancellor had already begun to
enforce trust arrangements that were not recognized in the common
law courts because there did not exist any procedural forms that could
recognize and determine the unique relationships among the trustor,
trustee, and beneficiary.1 0 3 Because of primogeniture, and the fact
that freehold land could not be devised by will, the law required that
between a son and a daughter, the son would inherit the father's land.
The only way for the father to provide for his daughter was to transfer
his property during his lifetime to a third party to hold for his use and
then, after he died, to transfer the property to his daughter.104 Freed
from these strict forms of action, however, the Chancellor was able to
enforce some trust agreements, for example, merely because in good
conscience one ought to abide by a promise.10 5
Thus, the law of trusts and uses developed through recorded prece-
dents into what became an elaborate and fixed body of law.106 As A.V.
Dicey observed:
100. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 94 (1979).
101. Id. at 95.
102. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 433-34 (1768).
103. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 635-36 (1995).
104. This example is borrowed from MILSOM, supra note 97, at 87. See also Subrin,
supra note 92, at 919; Langbein, supra note 103, at 633.
105. MAITLAND, supra note 89, at 27-29.
106. 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 304-309 (1924). Holdsworth
notes that the systematization of equity in the chancery court was furthered by
improvements in procedures in the common law courts, including, for example,
the growth of actions on the case, which reduced the need of many litigants to
petition the Chancellor. Id. at 301. For other reasons see id. at 300-02.
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Equity, which originally meant the discretionary, not to say arbitrary interfer-
ence of the Chancellor, for the avowed and often real purpose of securing sub-
stantial justice between the parties in a given case, might, no doubt, have
been so developed as to shelter and extend the despotic prerogative of the
Crown. But this was not the course of development which Equity actually
followed; at any rate from the time of Lord Nottingham (1673) it was obvious
that Equity was developing into a judicial system for the application of princi-
ples which, though different from those of the common law, were not less
fixed. 107
F.W. Maitland asserted that equity by the time of Blackstone was sim-
ply that part of the law "administered only by those certain courts
which would be known as courts of equity."10 8 The Judicature Acts of
1873 and 1875 abolished the procedural distinction between law and
equity so that the administration of equitable rules was no longer the
sole province of the chancery court.
B. American Equity
The Puritans carried their distaste of the monarchy and the fear of
arbitrary discretion with them from England to the New World.109
There were chancery courts of some sort in all thirteen colonies before
the Revolution.110 The colonists, however, had a healthy distrust of
the English chancery, which exercised power derived from the royal
prerogative and proceeded without a jury. After the Revolution, many
of the states retained the jurisdictional distinction between law and
equity, despite its origin in the royal prerogative, which would have
otherwise given them a "theoretical basis for resistance to courts of
equity."11 Even states that did not establish separate courts of eq-
uity incorporated equitable principles into their constitutions or legis-
lated equitable remedies and procedures. 1 12 However, in order to
justify exercise of the equitable function, which had in England been
based on the royal prerogative, there had to be a separation of the
legal function of equity from the source of its power. The Americans
chose to keep the beneficial function of equity as an alternative source
of remedies and discard the original justification for its existence (i.e.,
the King's responsibility to see that justice was done in all cases). But
this selective adoption of English practice left the colonists without a
justification for judicial exercise of the power of equity. The power of
107. DICEY, supra note 95, at 381.
108. MAITLAND, supra note 89, at 13.
109. See generally Subrin, supra note 92, at 926-29.
110. See Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, in 2 SE-
LECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 (1908).
111. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE 86 (1990). As Subrin puts it,
"After 1776, several states passed reception statutes that adopted the 'common
law.' Although exactly what had been received is not clear, English common law
procedures continued in force." Subrin, supra note 92, at 928.
112. See HOFFER, supra note 111, at 88-91.
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judges to stray from the democratically enacted, written law could not
be justified by the responsibility of the monarch, or the clergy, to see
that justice was done. What justification was there?
Peter Hoffer suggests that the legitimacy of equity in the republi-
can context was based not on royal prerogative but rather on public
trust. A trust is held by a trustee for the beneficiary and it imposes
fiduciary duties on the trustee. If those duties are violated, the trust
is subject to equitable remedies, including dissolution. Thus, the exer-
cise of equitable jurisdiction by the newly formed governments of the
states was legitimized in the same way every other government power
was legitimized, as an exercise of republican power (i.e., the power of
the people). According to Hoffer, by the turn of the century, 'Is]tate
equity practice had thoroughly republicanized equity."113 Thus, the
colonists chose to maintain the legal forms with which they were fa-
miliar, while selectively adapting them to the political system they
were creating.
The federal government did not establish separate courts of equity,
but engrafted the jurisprudential distinction in the Constitution and
maintained separate pleading and practice procedures. Article III,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution gives the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over all cases "in law and equity" that arise under its ju-
risdiction. Hoffer describes the issue that this forced the Framers to
confront:
[T]he legitimacy of public law rested not on the perceived need of individuals
or the interest groups they represented, but on conventional sources of au-
thority. In post revolutionary America, law derived from constitutions, stat-
utes, and precedent, supplemented by a handful of treatises and essays ....
However strong the sense of commercial crisis they shared, the Framers could
not hope to gain broad acceptance of the new Constitution in state ratifying
conventions if they created it without regard to existing practices of govern-
ance and law. 1 1 4
Perhaps because of simple familiarity, as Hoffer suggests, the issue
of granting equitable powers to the federal courts did not stir up much
debate, although the anti-federalists at the time did state their griev-
ances. 1 15 But the dual jurisdictional grant of law and equity in the
federal courts did spark some discussion which demonstrated that
generation's continuing reservations about discretionary powers
vested in judges and the potential for lawlessness that this entailed.
113. Id. at 100. Hoffer contends that on a grand scale, Thomas Jefferson employed
this reasoning in writing the Declaration of Independence, which allowed that if
the instruments of government did not pursue their entrusted duties of promot-
ing life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the beneficiaries (that is, the people
of the United States) could dissolve the government. See id. at 71-73.
114. Id. at 99.
115. See id.
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Thomas Jefferson, for example, feared that the granting of equita-
ble powers to common law courts would entice judges to put aside cen-
turies of common law rules: "Relieve the judges from the rigour of text
law, and permit them, with praetorian discretion, to wander into its
equity, and the whole legal system becomes uncertain."116 He said
this, despite the success of some of the colonies in administering dual
systems. In the constitutional context, the fear was that the granting
of equitable powers to federal judges would be interpreted by them as
a license to stray from enforcing the letter of the Constitution. The
Federal Farmer, a series of Anti-federalist letters published prior to
the ratification of the Constitution, voiced this concern:
It is a very dangerous thing to vest in the same judge power to decide on the
law, and also general powers in equity; for if the law restrain him, he is only to
step into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion
may dictate; ... equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be
mere discretion. 1 1 7
The fear was that by opening up cases "arising under" the Consti-
tution to equitable jurisdiction, federal judges would acquire "an arbi-
trary power or discretion . . . to decide as their conscience, their
opinions, their caprice, or their politics might dictate."1 1 s
Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, argued that it was neces-
sary to empower the federal courts with equity jurisdiction because
even under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, equita-
ble questions would arise, whether they involved classic equitable
questions such as those of fraud and trusts, or simply cases were there
was some "undue and unconscionable advantage" taken of one of the
parties. 1 19 Hamilton recognized the necessity not only of that part of
equity jurisdiction that had already hardened into legal principles, but
also of leaving some room for the exercise of judicial discretion to rem-
edy harms not otherwise systematically recognized, what Hamilton
referred to as "hard bargains."120 James Wilson, who shared Hamil-
ton's faith in the federal courts' ability to administer equity, also rec-
ognized the hardening principle, which was constantly operating in
equity:
[L]aw and equity are in a state of continual progression; one occupying inces-
santly the ground, which the other, in its advancement, has left. The posts
116. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
117. Letter from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
ALIST 244 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
118. Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 17, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
ALIST 322-23 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Interestingly, the Federal Farmer
recognized the hardening process that had already occurred in Great Britain, not-
ing that there, equity had acquired a "precise meaning" because the proceedings
had become systematic, unlike in the United States. Id. at 322.
119. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
120. See id.
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now possessed by strict law were formally possessed by equity; and the posts
now possessed by equity will hereafter be possessed by strict law .... In this
view of the subject, we shall find as little difficulty in pronouncing, that every
court of equity will gradually become a court of law; for its decisions, at first
discretionary, will gradually be directed by general principles and rules.
1 2 1
In fact, it is arguable that once equitable powers were granted to
the law courts, it was inevitable that they would take on the attributes
of the rule of law. Just the fact that in the American context, equita-
ble power was within the province of a completely independent judi-
cial branch and did not derive its power in any way from executive
prerogative, suggests from the outset that its administration would be
in accordance with judicial principles, particularly the rule of law and
judicial self-restraint.122 Thus, although the fear that equitable dis-
cretion would overrun the rule of law was understandable in the light
of the Revolutionary struggle, the context in which that discretion
would be exercised made it extremely unlikely, at least at that time,
that such fears would, on any grand scale, be realized. Nevertheless,
the grant of equitable power free from its historical and legitimating
justification as derived from the royal prerogative left it rootless. The
significance of this, and the risk that it entailed, only became appar-
ent with the advent of school desegregation and institutional reform
litigation.
The growth of the country during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century was accompanied by tremendous growth in the
law. Although legal reforms after the Revolution were relatively con-
servative and the law remained grounded in the English common law,
new, native law was created as the courts and legislatures set to work.
As one scholar has stated:
Lawyers noted a variety of ills besetting the legal order [around 1820]. Their
complaints fell into four broad areas: problems arising out of the magnitude
and diversity of the emerging legal product; the institutional role of the judici-
ary in the common law system; the continued close affinity of American law to
English jurisprudence; and the difficulties encountered in dealing with statu-
tory materials. 1
2 3
The diversity in legal doctrine among the states led some to fear
that the underlying principles of the common law were getting lost
and the complexity of the law would make it impossible for able people
to attempt to learn it so as to become lawyers. 12 4 The growth of law
and the vast areas of judicial discretion that it revealed and engen-
dered led to two related but distinct responses.
121. JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 486-87 (Rob-
ert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
122. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 8-9 (1956).
123. CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTE-
BELLUM LEGAL REFORM 47 (1981).
124. Id. at 49.
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One way in which this fear of discretion was addressed was
through the codification movement, whose proponents based their po-
sition on the belief that codification of the substantive law would elim-
inate much of the discretion of judges to interpret and change the
common law and the ability of lawyers to have a monopoly on its
use. 12 5 The relevance of that movement for these purposes is that it
resulted in the procedural merger of law and equity, initially in some
state courts, and then finally, in 1938, in the federal courts with the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This merger
first occurred in New York in 1848 with the advent of the Field Code,
which abolished the procedural distinction between law and equity,
and at the same time substantially restricted judicial discretion.126
Thus, not only were cases involving principles of law and cases involv-
ing principles of equity heard by the same judges, but both types of
principles could be applied in the same case, even to the same issue.
The codification movement can be seen as one response to a gen-
eral concern that judicial discretion, evinced by the growing amount oflaw being created by judges in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century, was proceeding in an undemocratic and haphazard
way. The other response was the rise of formalism.
The critique of the common law that the codification movement
brought to the fore was that, as the common law was developing in the
United States, it was neither systematic nor democratic. The most
obvious object of this criticism was equity jurisdiction which proceeded
with one judge and no jury. Moreover, it was not until the early nine-
teenth century that there were any written opinions of equity deci-
sions. At that time, James Kent, the Chancellor of New York's
chancery court, began recording his decisions. Chancellor Kent's goal
was to present equity jurisprudence as a "scientific system" which re-
lied upon principled decisionmaking.127 But it was Joseph Story who
fulfilled the "scientific" approach to equity jurisprudence with his
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, published in 1836. His pur-
pose was to demonstrate to the proponents of codification that codifi-
cation was unnecessary because the common law itself contained theprinciples necessary to contain judicial discretion and to constitute a
knowable, standardized system of law.
The only way to present equity jurisprudence as a science was by
emphasizing that the exercise of discretion was highly principled andlimited. Thus, Story began with Aristotle's definition of equity as a
correction of law where it is "defective by reason of universality,"128
125. Id. at 47. Cook's book covers this movement in great detail.
126. Subrin, supra note 92, at 934-35.
127. John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 547, 584 (1993).
128. 14 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1873).
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and noted that because this is true of all universal rules, there would
always be equity in any legal system. The discretion that must be
exercised in order to do this was a discretion bound by the objectives of
the legislature, not simply by individual conscience on a case by case
basis. In this sense, the most important maxim of equity for Story was
legem aequitas sequitur-equity follows the law-because "discretion
is a science, not to act arbitrarily, according to men's wills, and private
affections, so that discretion, which is executed here, is to be governed
by the rules of law and equity, which are not to oppose, but each in its
turn to be subservient to the other."129
The value of separate courts of equity was that they could adminis-
ter remedies for rights not recognized at common law and they had
the power to grant injunctions to vindicate rights and prevent wrongs,
whereas the common law courts could only give damages after the
wrong was done. Thus, the difference between equity courts and com-
mon law courts rested less with the amount of discretion that the
judges exercised than with the procedures each followed, particularly
the modes of trial, proof, and remedy.13 0
The important similarity between equity courts and common law
courts, which allowed for the "scientific" development of both, was the
importance of precedent. Only by following precedent could the equity
courts escape their reputation of being arbitrary. Quoting Lord
Redesdale in part, Story noted:
There are ... certain principles, on which courts of equity act, which are very
well settled. The cases which occur are various; but they are decided on fixed
principles. Courts of equity have, in this respect no more discretionary power
than courts of law. They decide new cases as they arise, by the principles, on
which former cases have been decided; and may thus illustrate, or enlarge, the
operation of those principles. But the principles are as fixed and certain, as
the principles on which the courts of common law proceed. In confirmation of
these remarks, it may be added, that the courts of common law are, in like
manner, perpetually adding to the doctrines of the old jurisprudence; and en-
larging, illustrating, and applying the maxims, which were first derived from
very narrow and often obscure sources.
1 3 1
Thus, the important distinction between law and equity courts was
not the relative amount of discretion exercised by each, but the fact
that the equity court could provide relief for rights that law courts
either did not recognize, or did not have the power to remedy.
Story's defense of the common law as principled and grounded in
precedent played an important part in preventing the codification
movement from reaching the level of success that its most radical pro-
ponents urged: the elimination of the common law and the extreme
restriction of judicial discretion. The combination of the codification
129. Id. at 12.
130. See id. at 52.
131. Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
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movement, which resulted in the procedural merger of law and equity
in many state courts, and the formal, scientific conception of law,
which took root in the nineteenth century, made equity more "palat-
able" by being reconceived as an orderly system of universal rules.132
The merger of law and equity meant that ordinary legal rights,
which otherwise would have been cognizable in law courts that had
previously lacked jurisdiction over equitable remedies, had the benefit
of such remedies. Equity no longer could be defined as the ability of a
certain court to create a remedy for a theretofore unrecognized right,
but now meant the ability of all courts, including the federal courts, to
use the remedies that once were the province of equity courts in any
dispute that they determined deserved such treatment and which met
the qualifications established by the courts. In the federal courts,
merger opened up all of these remedies to plaintiffs bringing lawsuits
under the Constitution and federal laws.
Thus, equity was no longer shorthand for the jurisdictional ques-
tion of where one should sue, or which procedures one should follow.
Because of that fact, Morton Horwitz has pointed out that one signifi-
cant result of these conceptual and procedural changes was the
final and complete emasculation of Equity as an independent source of legal
standards .... [As such, Equity was] transform[ed] .. .from an eighteenth
century system of substantive rules derived from 'natural justice' to a nine-
teenth century positivist conception of Equity as simply providing a more com-
plete and inclusive set of procedural remedies. 1 3 3
Through merger, equitable remedies were completely divorced
from their origin as remedies in situations that otherwise were not
legally cognizable because there was no legal rule under which the
complainant could sue. The court of chancery in England, it will be
recalled, did not declare rights, but rather acted in personam in a par-
ticular case by ordering relief to remedy a particular injury. As Mil-
som explains:
[Riesults were not declared to be so; instead parties were told to make them
so. When a seller of land refused to convey it, chancery did not declare that it
belonged to the buyer notwithstanding this: it compelled the conveyance.
Property in the land passed to the buyer because the seller after all conveyed
it to him: the seller conveyed it because chancery told him to, and would pun-
ish disobedience. 1 3 4
Historically, a right to an equitable remedy only came into being
after it was determined what remedy was appropriate for a particular
injury. Equity started with the remedy whereas "law" started with
132. RoscOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 155 (Peter Smith ed.,
1938). Subrin points out that Pound, although promoting procedure based on
equity, was also concerned with precision and uniformity. Subrin, supra note 92,
at 948.
133. MORTON HoRwITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 265
(1977).
134. MILSOM, supra note 97, at 90.
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the right. Since the remedy was determined first, the right was sim-
ply deduced from the contours of the remedy. As equity "hardened,"
the rights themselves were established. Yet, historically speaking, eq-
uitable rights were derivative of the remedies, which preceded them,
as the discussion of the law of trusts demonstrates.
135
Once equity and law were merged, these "extraordinary" remedies
could also be used to vindicate what were already legally cognizable
rights. Courts could now use equitable remedies to vindicate rights
that were in no way historically derivative of them. Thus, the a priori
link between the right and the remedy that had existed both at law
and at equity was severed when law and equity merged. 136 As Subrin
eloquently put it, "the tail of historic adjudication was now wagging
the dog."13 7 Yet, this did not mean, as Horwitz contended, that equity
was emasculated. Rather than being emasculated, it shifted in some
cases. For example, in desegregation cases, once a constitutional vio-
lation was recognized and a desegregation remedy was ordered, a new
scheme of jural relations was established where the court's order be-
came a duty imposed upon the defendants, which itself created new
rights (i.e., the right to particular relief in the plaintiff). Thus, equity,
as practiced in modern institutional reform litigation, has become a
new source of remedial rights, which have turned out to be quite
substantive.
C. Equity and Desegregation
It was this development which allowed equity to "triumph"
138 in
the second half of the twentieth century and set the stage for the mod-
ern problems with equitable remedies in institutional reform litiga-
tion. The potential for these modern problems came not with Brown v.
Board of Education, but with the hybrid system created in 1789 and
135. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. In fact, one influential legal
scholar in England, A.V. Dicey, argued that in England all legal rights were de-
rived from remedies. Because the English constitution consisted of the decisions
of judges in individual cases providing individual remedies, "there runs through
the English constitution that inseparable connection between the means of en-
forcing a right and the right to be enforced which is the strength ofjudicial legis-
lation." DICEY, supra note 95, at 194-95. According to Dicey, both legal and
equitable rights exist as the derivatives of remedies already imposed and one can
only know rights by knowing what remedy a court would provide. Id. In this
sense, Dicey anticipated Hohfeld's theory of the correlativity of rights and duties
which will be discussed in Part IV infra.
136. Daryl Levinson recently coined the term "rights essentialism" to describe the
(misleading) notion that rights can exist and be understood completely apart
from remedies. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibra-
tion, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999).
137. Subrin, supra note 92, at 922.
138. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54
(1993).
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1938 by the rejection of the royal prerogative on the one hand, and the
merger of the systems of law and equity on the other. Within a
merged system of law and equity, the problem of discretion is not only
whether a court will recognize a right not previously recognized in the
law, but also, even if recognized, how the court will remedy it. This, in
turn, resulted in a jurisprudential division between the right and the
remedy that historically was anathema to equity. As Abram Chayes
put it in his discussion of institutional reform litigation:
At this point, right and remedy are pretty thoroughly disconnected. The form
of relief does not flow ineluctably from the liability determination, but is fash-
ioned ad hoc. In the process, moreover, right and remedy have been to some
extent transmuted. The liability determination is not simply a pronounce-
ment of the legal consequences of past events, but to some extent a prediction
of what is likely to be in the future. And relief is not a terminal, compensatory
transfer, but an effort to devise a program to contain future consequences in a
way that accommodates the range of interests involved. 1 3 9
Conceptually, the definition of a right in equity is no longer depen-
dent upon the type of remedy chosen because the right came first.
This is why Gary L. McDowell points out the irony in the codifiers'
success in merging law and equity. Their goal was to limit judicial
discretion by replacing the common law with statute, but in the con-
text of their procedural reforms, they ended up giving judges even
greater discretion because judges could now use their equitable pow-
ers in many more cases:
By combining procedures in law with procedures in equity the Court in effect
ignored the dangers of equity the Founders had recognized .... In the at-
tempt to reduce equity to a safe and more certain code, the Court paved the
way for the power of equity to be exercised with a disregard for precedent and
procedure. By tearing equity loose from the bindings of common-law proce-
dure, it had rendered suits at equity simpler in process but at the price of
emasculating equity as a source of substantive law. Equity became nothing
more than a set of procedural remedies reflective of the current opinion of ajudge. Equity jurisprudence, wrenched free of the common law, was thus de-
prived of the moderating force of history. 1 4 0
Those who argue that institutional reform litigation remedies are
illegitimate because they extend judicial power beyond the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution, fail to take into account the circum-
stances under which equity was adopted, adapted, and then procedur-
ally emasculated in the United States. John Yoo, for example,
expands upon Justice Thomas' view in Jenkins III and argues that the
Framers intended the grant of equity jurisdiction to the Supreme
139. Chayes, supra note 76, at 1293-94. In a later article, Chayes went further, stat-ing that "there is no way to reason from the 'right' to a desegregated school sys-
tem established by Brown to the content of the decree in any particular case. It is
equally impossible to work backward from the relief to define the contours of the
right." Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4, 50 (1982).
140. GARY L. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 93 (1982).
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Court to be purely jurisdictional and nothing more, solely to avoid
problems such as Supreme Court review of state equity courts.
14 1
Otherwise, Yoo argues, federal courts lack institutional authority to
impose institutional remedies. But how can we know the scope of eq-
uitable authority when it was stripped of its original reason for exis-
tence, the King's prerogative, without a clear replacement, and then
stripped of its procedural distinctiveness? One could as easily say
that these events created a new, unique, and legitimate type of judi-
cial power that remained dormant until awoken by the Brown case.
One can see an example of this kind of judicial power at work in
the first remedial opinion issued in Jenkins v. Missouri.142 This
school desegregation case was brought by the school board and chil-
dren of the school board members in the Kansas City, Missouri, School
District ("KCMSD") claiming that the State had created and main-
tained a system of racially segregated schools. In ordering a remedy
which included, inter alia, a reduction in class sizes, creation of a sum-
mer school program, magnet school programs, staff development pro-
grams, and capital improvements, the court relied upon highly
generalized principles. In describing its remedial powers, the court
stated:
The principles that have guided this Court in implementing a desegregation
plan for the KCMSD are clear. "In fashioning, and effectuating (desegrega-
tion) ... decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs."
Further, the goal of a desegregation decree is clear. The goal is the elimi-
nation of all vestiges of state imposed segregation. In achieving this goal, the
district court may use its broad equitable powers, recognizing that these pow-
ers do have limits. Those limits include the nature and scope of the constitu-
tional violation, the interests of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs consistent with the constitution, and insuring that the remedy is
designed to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position that
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.
1 4 3
The only principles guiding the court in creating a decree are on the
one hand, flexibility, and on the other, the legal standard for success
(i.e., the elimination of vestiges of segregation). There are no princi-
ples for how the court is supposed to measure whether its proposed
plan, or the plan submitted by the parties, will cure the effects of
segregation.
141. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1158 (1996); see also, Grupo Mex-
icano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 316 (1999) (noting that
the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to the type of relief tradi-
tionally accorded by the English courts of equity).
142. 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
143. Id. at 23 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
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Predictably, the introduction of this type of discretion, which arose
theoretically with the merger of law and equity and practically with
the advent of institutional reform litigation, brought with it fears that
judges were no longer bound by rules and principles in the remedial
stage of institutional reform litigation. As discussed above, concern
about the absence of rules and principles has been widespread and
ongoing since Brown I was decided. The problem is that there has not
developed a satisfactory way in which the remedial law in these cases
could "harden" the way previous equitable discretion has. The pri-
mary reason for the failure of equitable discretion in institutional re-
form litigation to evolve and harden in the way it has historically is
that there is no workable standard of success. For example, the stan-
dard for measuring success now, as stated by the Court in Board of
Education v. Dowell, that the vestiges of discrimination be eliminated
"to the extent practicable,"144 provides little guidance as to what cur-
rent conditions might count as a vestige.
The principles which are intended to guide courts in formulating a
remedy, which should also be useful in measuring success and thus
justifying termination, are highly generalized and offer no practical
guide as to whether the relief ordered is capable of being quickly and
effectively implemented. In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II),145 for
example, the Court set out three factors to guide courts in exercising
equitable jurisdiction in school desegregation cases. 146 These factors
were:
In the first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of the desegrega-
tion remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional
violation .... The remedy must therefore be related to 'the condition alleged
to offend the Constitution....' Second, the decree must indeed be remedial in
nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims
of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the ab-
sence of such conduct.' Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must
take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs, consistent with the Constitution .... Once invoked, 'the scope of
a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth
and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. 1 4 7
Thus, Justice Thomas' concern that the courts lack the inherent
power to order vast, complex, remedies in institutional reform litiga-
tion is misplaced. The equitable power exercised in institutional re-
form litigation originated in English practice, was modified upon
importation into the United States, gained power with the merger of
law and equity, and came to fruition when invoked to remedy the
144. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
145. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
146. In Milliken H, the Court referred to Brown II's reference to "equitable principles"
that should guide courts in fashioning desegregation decrees. But what these
principles are was not spelled out in either case.
147. Id. at 280-81 (citations omitted).
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rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment.148 If history teaches us
anything about the legitimacy of complex and enduring equitable rem-
edies, it can only be agnosticism. But that does not mean Justice
Thomas' other concerns are unwarranted. To say that the courts have
the power to remedy constitutional violations in large public institu-
tions is not to say that the way in which courts have been creating and
implementing those remedies is optimal. The concerns about discre-
tion and effectiveness remain, but the issue must be reformulated.
The power to order institutional change in institutional reform liti-
gation has led to a crisis in equity similar to the crises facing the
Chancellors in England. As in those instances, equity in institutional
reform litigation must find a way to harden through the application of
knowable, general principles. Thus, rather than view the exercise of
discretion as a sign of illegitimacy of institutional reform litigation,
this exercise of discretion can be understood as the first stage in the
hardening process. That this is the current state of institutional re-
form litigation was well articulated by David Kirp:
[T]he Supreme Court's lack of clarity in explicating doctrine has required a
different reasoning process, which defines the wrong by inspecting what is
required by way of remedy. Judicial decision-making with respect to segrega-
tion is thus at its heart incremental. Wrong defines remedy, which in turn
redefines wrong. The Court moves away from the evil to be undone, not to-
ward some predetermined end. Brown sets in motion a decision-making strat-
egy rather than resolving a problem. 1 4 9
Unlike the law of trusts, described above, which developed out of
the consistent application of particular remedies, desegregation juris-
prudence, because of the Court's lack of clarity at its inception, has
faltered. The complexity of desegregation remedies has prevented
them from developing into a coherent doctrine that could then clarify
the nature of the right at issue. The task, therefore, is to find a way to
reconceive equitable remedies so that the judge's discretion at the
remedy stage is guided by principle and precedent analogous to the
principles and precedents that guide judges at the liability stage. Ste-
phen Subrin put it this way:
The defense of equity power in constitutional cases designed to restructure
public institutions tends to undervalue the problem of how to translate rights,
constitutional or otherwise, into daily realities for the bulk of citizens. As-
pects of common law procedure and thought, not equity, may be required to
help deliver or vindicate rights, now that equity has opened a new rights
frontier. 150
148. See Akhil R. Amar, Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow of Brown, 40 WASHBURN
L.J. 1, 7 (2000) ("The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments provide... clear[ ]
... support for the idea that our Reconstructed Constitution is refounded on prin-
ciples of free and equal citizenship.").
149. DAVID L. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS 52 (1982).
150. Subrin, supra note 92, at 913.
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The remedial principles of equity must be formalized, just as Jus-
tice Story attempted to formalize the principles of equitable rights in
the nineteenth century. This would give courts the tools with which to
exercise their discretion at the termination stage in a productive and
effective way. The key to that formalization lies in Justice Thomas'
other concern expressed in Jenkins III about the nature of the consti-
tutional right at issue.
IV. RIGHTS & INTERESTS
[D]iscussions of ... jural interests seem inadequate . . . for the very reason
that they are not founded on a sufficiently comprehensive and discriminating
analysis of jural relations in general. Putting the matter in another way, the
tendency-and the fallacy-has been to treat the specific problem as if it were far
less complex than it really is; and this commendable effort to treat as simple
that which is really complex has, it is believed, furnished a serious obstacle to
the clear understanding, the orderly statement, and the correct solution of
legal problems.
-Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld15 1
A. Introduction
The importation of equity into the United States and its merger
with law in the late nineteenth century gave to judges a powerful re-
medial tool. The unlinking of rights from equitable remedies, in the
context of a constitutional system that gave primacy to certain rights,
coupled with the advent of the modern bureaucratic state, made insti-
tutional reform litigation inevitable. Initially just in theory, but fi-
nally in fact, judges could use this new power to order vast remedies.
They willingly began exercising this power in the 1960s in the context
of school desegregation, then prison reform, and then hospital reor-
ganization cases, to name a few types of institutional reform litigation.
Unlike in early equity cases, where the remedy in effect preceded the
explicit recognition of a right, courts approached these cases by find-
ing liability and then, in separate proceedings, formulating a remedy.
Because of this, there emerged a temporal and doctrinal separation
between the right stage and the remedy stage of these cases. The ar-
chetype of this separation is the year that separated the liability opin-
ion and the remedial opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.
One result of this doctrinal separation between the right and the
remedy stage in school desegregation cases is that it has set equity
free from its most fundamental defining characteristic: the harm that
it is intended to remedy. Since both the concept and appropriate ap-
plication of equity is so vague, and yet so potentially far reaching, once
it was divorced from specific legal violations and was set free to work
151. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 19 (1913).
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on any legal violation, it became impossible to know in any particular
case how far its reach was or should be without invoking some politi-
cal consideration-whether it be frustration with uncooperative school
officials, or overemphasis on local school control-that moved the fo-
cus from the fundamental issue of vindicating constitutional rights.
As explained above, this separation led judges to exercise substan-
tial discretion in remedying rights violations. In Brown H, the reme-
dial opinion of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), the Supreme
Court set out broad standards to be followed by district courts when
drawing up desegregation remedies. The Court emphasized both the
flexibility of equity and the fact that the decree must address the
plaintiffs' interests. 152 It found that the constitutional principles at
stake indicated that the plaintiffs had an interest in admission to
school on a nondiscriminatory basis, and that the defendants had a
duty "to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
system."15 3
In the early, post-Brown, desegregation cases, the Court exploited
the vagueness of the reach of equity by coupling its understanding of
the practical flexibility of equity with its strong view of the right at
stake. In Green v. County School Board,154 the Court expressed its
frustration with the defendants' unwillingness to implement a practi-
cal desegregation plan by articulating a broad right. The Court under-
stood this broad right to include both the "immediate" right to
nondiscriminatory school assignments as well as the "ultimate" right
to a "unitary, nonracial system of public education"155 and to the elim-
ination of the effects of past discrimination.156
A few years later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed-
ucation,15 7 the Court acknowledged that a lack of guidelines hindered
previous efforts at effective desegregation and noted that the "essence
of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity
and to mold each decree to the necessities of the particular case," and
emphasized that "flexibility rather than rigidity" was the hallmark of
equity.1 58 The task of the court in these cases was to "correct... the
condition that offends the Constitution"15 9 and "eliminate from the
152. Brown H, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
153. Id. at 301.
154. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
155. Id. at 436.
156. Id. at 438 n.4 ("'We bear in mind that the court has not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future."' (quoting Loui-
siana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145,154 (1965)).
157. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
158. Id. at 15.
159. Id. at 16.
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public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation."160 The Court
concerned itself with substantive fairness, not with the semantic dis-
tinctions involved in defining the scope of equity.161 Thus, the Court
determined that in remedying the effects of past discrimination,
school districts likely had to go beyond merely making race neutral
student assignments, and held that the exercise of judicial equitable
power permitted the use of mathematical ratios in determining stu-
dent assignments, the alteration of attendance zones, and the trans-
portation of students (busing).162 The remedies provided in these
early desegregation cases, where the Court was often faced with fierce
resistance to its holding in Brown, the powers of equity, and the reme-
dies it allowed, were a direct function of the Court's expansive under-
standing of the plaintiffs' right to go to a school that was free from
racial discrimination.
Swann is also significant because it fixed the right-remedy separa-
tion that was formally introduced in Brown I and Brown II. The
Swann Court set an extremely broad and undefined goal for desegre-
gation remedies (the elimination of the vestiges of desegregation) and
then invoked an equally broad judicial power to create remedies, with-
out ever explaining the theoretical or practical nexus between them.
This left later courts with the task of either exercising this broad
power in perpetuity, or of finding a principled way to limit it as politics
demanded. Predictably, courts have taken the latter approach, limit-
ing the scope of desegregation remedies by focusing on the limits of
the equitable power. This has been accomplished by the invocation of
some familiar and long-standing doctrines.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Court began to focus on the sub-
stantial limits on equity in order to create a sense of limitation and
discipline in its desegregation jurisprudence. The main impetus for
this change was that in northern school desegregation cases, begin-
ning in Denver with Keyes v. School District No. 1,163 the existence
and scope of the violation became an issue. In the earlier cases (all of
which involved southern school districts), the violation (intentional
discrimination by race), was easily proved because it was written into
the law. In Keyes, where no such law existed, the Court held that in-
tentional discrimination could not be assumed merely by the existence
of schools segregated by race, but instead, had to be proven.16 4 This
was a difficult and time consuming process.165 It also introduced into
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. at 31.
162. Id. at 25-31.
163. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
164. See id.
165. See CHARLES S. BULLOCK, IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 59 (Charles
S. Bullock III & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1984).
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the liability determination the issue of local control. Issues of local
autonomy and control arise naturally from discussions of the, intent of
local authorities in assigning students and faculty and in making deci-
sions about opening and closing schools. Thus, in this next wave of
cases, defendants were able to shift the focus to the remedy and the
extent of the remedial duty arising out of liability for intentional seg-
regation. Through these cases, the Court developed a more limited
view of the powers of equity and its relationship to the duty owed by
the Equal Protection Clause.
For example, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),166 the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the district court to use the entire De-
troit metropolitan area to desegregate the Detroit School District be-
cause it amounted to an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict
violation, which contravened the remedial requirement that the na-
ture of the violation dictates the scope of the remedy. 16 7 The Court, in
finding that the remedy had to be limited to the school district found
to have practiced segregation, put great emphasis on the tradition of
local control of public schools, arguing that it was the most deeply
rooted tradition in public education. 168 While mentioning that the
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy, it viewed
the violation not from the point of view of its effects on the plaintiff
class, but from the point of view of the geographical and administra-
tive position of the violators, 169 thereby de-emphasizing the right of
the plaintiffs to attend a "racially nondiscriminatory school
system."170
More recently, in Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 171 the Supreme
Court struck down a remedy based on "desegregative attractiveness,"
which attempted to improve the Kansas City School District to such
an extent that white students from private schools and outlying dis-
tricts would choose to attend those schools, thereby voluntarily deseg-
regating those schools. One of the Court's rationales for striking this
down was that because there was no limit on how much spending the
district court could order to create "desegregative attractiveness," it
166. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
167. Id. at 738.
168. Id. at 741-43; see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406,
410 (1977) ("local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition"); Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 (1976) (noting that the Milliken I decision was
based on the limitations on the federal courts' exercise of their equity power be-
cause the remedial order was not commensurate with the constitutional
violation).
169. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746.
170. Id. at 754-55 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
171. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
could put off the return of the school district to local control
indefinitely. 172
When the issue of local control is raised in desegregation cases, it
can have a powerful effect because concepts about local authority are
well developed, they appear not only in federal cases, but in fact date
back to the issues in The Federalist papers and the dispute between
the Federalists and the Jeffersonians.173 Thus, they are easy to in-
voke and understand. The interests underlying the constitutional
right to equal protection in the context of school segregation, on the
other hand, have not been fully developed and are therefore easily
manipulated, either as justification for limitless remedies (this is ar-
guably what occurred in the district court in Missouri v. Jenkins174) or
to strike down remedies when a court is not faced with the kind of
egregious local segregative motives and actions of an earlier time.
Thus, when there is not a clear and articulable connection made
between the right and the remedy, it matters whether one thinks of
equal protection in general, and the segregation problem in particular,
172. Id. at 100. Gary Orfield points out the irony that in Jenkins III, the Court, pre-
mised on its concern with local autonomy, struck down the remedy which pro-
moted local autonomy by funding the district's requested educational
improvements. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 97 (1996);
see also David I. Levine, The Chinese American Challenge to Court-Mandated
Quotas in San Francisco's Public Schools: Notes from a (Partisan) Participant-
Observer, 16 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 39, 122, 124 (2000) (describing as a "myth"
the notion that school districts desire a return to local control).
173. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 108-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); cf. Jared A. Levy, Note, Blinking at Reality: The Implications of Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas's Influential Approach to Race and Education, 78 B. U. L.
REV. 575, 601-03 (1998) (noting the Fourteenth Amendment's intentional en-
croachment on state power and federalism). But see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & ED-
WARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE 20 (1998)
(contending that federalism and separation of powers concerns were appropriate
and understandable at the time of the framing of the Constitution, but now, in
the modern bureaucratic state, may be "showing their age").
174. As the Supreme Court noted, in addition to mandating a low student-teacher ra-
tio, establishing a full-day kindergarten, expanding the summer program, and
mandating teacher salary increases (to name just a few remedies), the district
court ordered long-range capital improvements which included:
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an
alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium;
green houses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air conditioned
meeting room for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language
translation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an edit-
ing and animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie edit-
ing and screening rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics
room; 1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo
project; swimming pools; and numerous other facilities.
Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 79 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 495 U.S. 33,
77 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
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from the point of view of the violators or that of the victims (i.e., as
primarily a question of remedy or a question of right). An emphasis
on one or the other affects the standards for judging the legality of
remedies to correct constitutional violations. If a court at the remedy
stage is primarily concerned with the rights of the plaintiffs, it is going
to create a remedy and keep it in force until those rights are vindi-
cated, justifying its position by emphasizing both the content and seri-
ousness of the right, and the broad flexibility of equity. We see this in
the early cases in which the Court established that the scope of the
violation includes not only the intentional segregative acts, but also
the effects these acts had.175 The Court has stated that the defendant
school districts must return the plaintiffs to the position they would
have been in without the unconstitutional segregation.17 6 Another
way this standard has been articulated is that the defendant is under
a duty to eliminate the "vestiges of state-imposed segregation" 177 and
create a "unitary school system." Yet, as already discussed, these
terms are almost entirely undefined. We might understand the dis-
trict court in Missouri v. Jenkins as thinking in terms of this model. It
poured so much money and innovation into the Kansas City school
system so that the plaintiffs could acquire good schools, thereby elimi-
nating the vestiges of past discrimination and returning the plaintiffs
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of
discrimination.
Justice Thurgood Marshall explicitly held this view. He consist-
ently discussed the remedial duty in terms of the plaintiffs' rights.
For example, in Dowell, writing in dissent, he accused the majority of
ignoring the fact that the harm to the plaintiffs can continue beyond
the time a state stops practicing segregation.1 78 He viewed the reme-
dial question as whether the defendant was taking "the steps neces-
sary to cure that condition which offends the Fourteenth
Amendment." 179
On the other hand, if the court focuses more on the remedial issue,
it will conceive of a remedy in terms of the duty and then consider it
175. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)..
176. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
177. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
178. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 251 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 784; see also Dowell, 498 U.S. at 260 (arguing that the
right to be free from stigmatic injury should be the focus of the Court's inquiry
into whether a district court can dissolve a desegregation decree); John C. Jef-
fries, Jr., The Right Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 111-
112 (1999) (describing how single-ceiling began as a remedy for unconstitutional
conditions and eventually took on a life of its own so that double-celling became
per se unconstitutional, until the Supreme Court balked in Chapman v. Rhodes,
434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd 452
U.S. 337 (1980)).
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implemented when the defendants can demonstrate implementation,
or at least a good faith effort to implement it as far as possible.180
That is, the standard of success of the remedy will focus not on
whether the rights of the plaintiffs have been vindicated, but on
whether the defendants have carried through on the terms of the re-
medial duty.
In its most recent discussion of this issue, in Jenkins III, after
pointing out that the desegregation plan in Kansas City after almost
twenty years had cost close to $200 million, the Court stated that the
"ultimate inquiry" in determining whether the district court could end
at least some of its supervision, was "whether the [constitutional vio-
lator] ha[s] complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since
it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve]
been eliminated to the extent practicable."isi This included an analy-
sis of whether the district court's orders had served to "restor[e] the
victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have oc-
cupied in the absence of that conduct,"' 8 2 coupled with an interest in
eventually restoring control of the school district to state and local
authorities.
Yet, when the Court struck down the part of the desegregation or-
der that was premised on the goal of "desegregative attractiveness" as
an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict violation, it did not factor
into its analysis whether desegregative attractiveness was effective in
restoring the plaintiffs to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of segregation or whether it helped to eliminate the vestiges
of discrimination. Rather, as discussed above, in its review of the rem-
edy, it concentrated on the limits of the equitable judicial power as the
justification for striking down that aspect of the decree. The vague-
ness of the Court's understanding of the violation lost out to the well
developed judicial doctrine of local control.18 3 Although the Court
continues to insist that the scope of the right determines the scope of
the remedy, the separation of the two has resulted in a desegregation
jurisprudence which is currently rooted in the purported limitations
180. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491-92 (1992); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248-50.
181. Jenkins II, 515 U.S. at 89.
182. Id. at 70.
183. Similarly, in ruling on the appropriateness of the district court's denial of the
State's attempt to achieve partial unitary status because test scores in the Kan-
sas City schools were lower than the national average, the Court noted that "the
District Court must bear in mind that its end purpose is not only 'to remedy the
violation' to the extent practicable, but also 'to restore state and local authorities
to the control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Consti-
tution.'" Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 102 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489).
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on equity rather than the opportunity of equitable remedies to correct
rights violations. 18 4
Despite the fact that the liability and remedy stages of institu-
tional reform litigation have evolved into separate and distinct pro-
ceedings, the desegregation jurisprudence that evolved out of Brown is
characterized by the reiteration of the necessity of creating a fact-
based connection between the right and the remedy. The nature of
this connection is premised on the notion that the scope of the viola-
tion determines the scope of the remedy, an oft repeated phrase.
1 8 5
Logically, therefore, the connection between the right and the remedy
must depend, at least initially, on determining the scope of the viola-
tion. The Court has failed, however, to define the scope of the
violation.
In fact, the contours of the requirement that the scope of the right
determines the scope of the remedy has thus far been stated almost
entirely in platitudes, which have become mysterious terms of art that
have little ability to function as principled explanations and limita-
tions on the reach of equitable remedies. As a result, the extent of
equitable power at the remedy stage is not firmly rooted in the nature
of the right that has been violated. Thus, from an historical perspec-
tive, one can view the Court's current desegregation jurisprudence as
two steps removed from the origin of its equitable powers. First, there
was the separation of the right and remedy in equity which came
about primarily through the promulgation of the 1938 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the merger of law and equity. The second step
in this separation is the inability of the Court, despite its insistence on
their connection, to articulate the connection between the breach of
the duty not to deny equal protection, and the remedial duties to
which this breach gives rise. Thus, not only is the remedy not explic-
itly tied to the right by virtue of the order in which they arise, but it is
also not sufficiently tied to the right by the legal theories created by
the Court.
Thus, the nature of the constitutional right at stake must be ex-
plored more thoroughly if there is ever going to be any principled
rights-based limitation on the reach of equity in institutional reform
litigation in general, and school desegregation cases in particular.
This exploration must include an attempt to understand what the
Court means when it talks about the "scope of the violation." For if
184. Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two
Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 552 (1999) ("Deference to the wrongdoer
elevates the defendants' interests to an explicit part of the remedial calculus,
rather than keeping the remedy focused on redressing the rights of the victims.").
185. See Jenkins IIl, 515 U.S. at 88; Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280; Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971); Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation,
78 CoLuM. L. REV. 784, 854 (1978).
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that is the ultimate limit on a court's equitable powers at the remedy
stage, then we must at least try to understand it.
B. Hohfeld
The starting point for any discussion of the modern use of the lan-
guage of rights must be with Wesley Hohfeld. In 1913, Hohfeld pub-
lished his article Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 186 where he tried to identify and classify the sub-
tleties involved in the discussion of legal rights.187
Jeremy Bentham in particular may be credited with anticipating
Hohfeld's project insofar as his most caustic criticism of natural rights
centered on the extreme ambiguity of the language of rights. Speak-
ing of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,
Bentham declared:
The logic of it is of a piece with its morality:- perpetual vein of nonsense, flow-
ing from a perpetual abuse of words,-words having a variety of meanings in
the same page,-words used in meanings not their own, where proper words
were equally at hand,-words and propositions of the most unbounded signifi-
cation, turned loose without any of those exceptions or modifications which
are so necessary on every occasion to reduce their import within the compass,
no only of right reason, but even of the design in hand, of whatever nature it
may be. 188
Unlike Bentham, however, Hohfeld's project was an analytical one
only: to reveal complexity by capturing the hidden detail in assertions
about rights, thereby providing a descriptive account of what we mean
when we talk about rights.189 Hohfeld categorized rights into four
groups, each with a distinct meaning, and each then coupled with an
opposite and a correlative. The four categories were claim-right, privi-
lege, liberty, and immunity. Hohfeld laid this out in the following
table:190
Jural Opposites: claim-right privilege power immunity
no-right duty disability liability
Jural Correlatives: claim-right privilege power immunity
duty no-right liability disability
186. Hohfeld, supra note 151, at 16.
187. Hohfeld, however, was not the first to notice the ambiguity in rights talk. Rich-
ard Tuck, for example, traced the idea of rights back to the fourteenth century
and demonstrates that the language of rights has always been equivocal, not in
the least because the language of rights is so malleable. RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL
RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1979).
188. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM,
BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 48 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987).
189. Cardozo characterized Hohfeld's project as "a plea that fundamental conceptions
be analyzed more clearly, and their logical conclusions, developed more consist-
ently." BENJAMIN N. CRDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 37 (1949).
190. Hohfeld, supra note 151, at 36.
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To Hohfeld, a right is best described as the prerequisite for requir-
ing someone else to behave in a certain way toward the right holder.
Thus, a claim-right is correlative with a duty and its opposite is a no-
right. If one has a claim-right, then someone else is under an obliga-
tion to act toward the right holder in a certain way, and the holder of
the claim-right does not have a no-right (this is obviously tautological,
which underscores its categorization as an opposite). Thus, my claim-
right to payment of a debt correlates with someone else's duty to pay
the debt. Privileges, on the other hand, refer to my ability to behave
in a certain way without interference. If one person has a privilege,
then someone else has a correlative no-right, and the holder of the
privilege also has no duty. Thus, my privilege to speak my mind about
a political situation is correlative with the rest of the world's no-right
to interfere with my speech, and it also means I am under no duty not
to speak my mind on the topic.
The notion of a legal power is that one is capable of changing one's
legal relations. 19 1 Thus, David Lyons cites the example of one's capac-
ity or ability to get married and transfer one's own property as exam-
ples of legal powers. 19 2 If one has a legal power, someone else would
be under a liability (the correlative of power), and the holder of the
power would not be under a disability (the opposite of power) from
exercising that power. Hohfeld gives the example of a contract offer to
illustrate how power and liability correlate. If A offers to sell goods to
B, and A agrees to keep the offer open for one week, during that week,
B has the power to buy those goods, and A is under a liability that she
may have to sell those goods. 19 3 Lastly, the notion of immunity refers
to the immunity holder's security in not having her legal relations
changed by a certain person, who is in turn under a correlative disa-
bility as to changing those relations. To illustrate, Hohfeld gives the
example of a property holder who is immune from certain others
transferring her ownership to themselves or anyone else. Those
others are thus under a disability from performing that transfer. Be-
cause liability is the opposite of immunity, it can also be said that the
property holder is not under a liability to have such a change affected.
191. See id. at 51.
192. DAVID LYONS, RIGHTS 9 (1979)
193. This is a much watered-down version of Hohfeld's illustration. See Hohfeld, supra
note 151, at 55. It is worth noting Carl Wellman's contention that there is also a
liability connected to the power to marry because for a marriage to be valid, not
only must both parties consent (an exercise of their powers), but they must also
enlist the aid of someone else: a minister, rabbi, justice of the peace, etc. who has
the legal power to marry them. As to this person, the couple, in Hohfeldian
terms, has a liability to be married. This liability is most evident in the context of
same-sex marriages where the legal invalidity of these unions derives not from
the failure of the couple to exercise of their powers of consent, but the absence of
any legally recognized power of the individual officiating to marry them. CARL
WELLMAN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS 86-89 (1985).
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Hohfeld's categories have proven useful to generations of legal
scholars and judges as an aid in thinking analytically about rights,194
but they have also been the subject of some criticism for their failure
to capture everything that Hohfeld intended.195 In any event, there
are two important facts that Hohfield's analysis forces us to confront.
First, it cannot be denied that when one makes a statement such as "I
have a right to X," one might easily be talking about a right, privilege,
power, or immunity, or some combination of two or more of them. By
understanding Hohfeld's analysis, we are better able to understand
what one means by such a statement, and are therefore in a better
position to understand its implications for the behavior of others in
relation to it. Second, by breaking down the meaning of the statement
"I have a right to X," Hohfeld also alerts us to the important distinc-
tion between rights and privileges. Only if one has a right in the more
limited Hohfeldian "claim-right" sense can the violation of it be re-
dressed by the imposition on another of a duty.196 As one scholar put
it, rights are "nothing but duties imposed on others. Rights define the
extent of the legal protection that is granted to the interest."' 97 Privi-
leges by themselves are just the freedom to act in a certain way, and if
harm to others results, the privilege-holder is not liable for that harm,
which remains damnum absque injuria.
It might be useful, therefore, to apply Hohfeld's scheme to the legal
issues involved in desegregation jurisprudence in order to reveal the
complexity involved in applying the Fourteenth Amendment's com-
mand that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."198
Initially, if the duty not to deny equal protection of the laws means
that the government has a duty to be neutral in school assignments
194. See, e.g.,WELLMAN, supra note 193; J.G. Wilson, Hohfeld: A Reappraisal, 11 U.
QUEENSLAND L.J. 190 (1980).
195. See LYONS, supra note 192, at 10-11; David Lyons, The Correlativity Of Rights
And Duties 4 Nous 45 (1970).
196. David Lyons has argued rights and duties are not always correlative by demon-
strating that what he calls "active rights" (Hohfeld's privileges) such as the right
to free speech, do not correlate with duties because the duties of noninterference
with such rights were created not to protect those rights per se, but for other
reasons. Laws against assault, for example, primarily exist to protect one's inter-
est in bodily integrity, even though they also serve as duties of non-interference
correlative to the right to free speech. Whether one wants to call the duties cor-
relative to "active rights" and "privileges" duties or, in Hohfeld's terminology, "no-
rights," it is important to recognize that even though those duties/no-rights ex-
isted prior to the active rights/privileges, if they had not been already in exis-
tence, they would have had to be created once the active right/privilege was
recognized. DAVID LYONS, Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries, in RIGHTS 58-77
(David Lyons ed., 1979).
197. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 1039.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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(i.e., not to discriminate in school assignments), then African-Ameri-
can children have a right to be assigned to school on a non-discrimina-
tory basis and therefore an immunity from being forced into
segregated schools. Correlative with these rights on the part of Afri-
can-American children is the State's duty to assign all children to
school on a non-discriminatory basis, and the State's disability from
making racially discriminatory assignments.
This application of Hohfeld's analysis is fairly straightforward. It
amounts to a simple acknowledgment that the Equal Protection
Clause is stated in the form of a duty' 9 9 and that it confers on all
citizens a correlative right that the State comply with that duty. The
more difficult question presented by desegregation jurisprudence is
whether there are in fact other rights and duties that can be deduced
from the Equal Protection Clause, or whether other interests that
some might understand to be rights remain as just privileges, powers,
or immunities.
For example, in Hohfeldian terms, the duty not to deny equal pro-
tection, and its correlative right, as outlined above, also includes a
privilege, but no duty, on the part of the State200 to provide an ade-
quate education so long as it does so equally. But it does not afford a
particular right on the part of African-American children to have an
adequate education. This must also mean that the State has a privi-
lege, but no duty, to provide an inadequate education, again, so long
as it does so on equal terms. Accordingly, there is also an immunity
by government to a lawsuit based on inadequate educational opportu-
nities alone, which is correlative with a disability on the part of school-
children to demand an adequate education grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause. 201
This analysis highlights that any lawsuit making demands on the
government based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the
context of segregation is faced, at least in Hohfeldian terms, with a
very limited duty, and therefore a very limited right. If the duty in-
volved is not to discriminate on the basis of race in school assign-
ments, then the logical Hohfeldian right that correlates is the right to
not have the State make such discriminatory assignments. The logi-
cal remedy for such discrimination then is simply to have the State
stop discriminating. Consequently, at least one way to understand
199. In fact, the duty is stated in the form of a double negative, viz, the duty not to
deny equal protection.
200. This analysis deals only with the United States Constitution, and does not take
into account state laws and constitutions which might require a higher duty to
provide, for example, a certain type and/or level of education. See, e.g., ARK.
CONST. art. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
201. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("[Tjhe
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages.").
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Justice Thomas' concurrence in Jenkins III is as an attempt to apply a
Hohfeldian account of remedies to the desegregation context. In fact,
Justice Thomas notes that "the point of the Equal Protection Clause is
not to enforce strict race-mixing, but to ensure that blacks and whites
are treated equally by the State without regard to their skin color"
and that "[r] acial isolation itself is not a harm; only state-enforced seg-
regation is."202
This interpretation of the nature of the right to equal protection
demonstrates the inherent, and perhaps intended, limitations of the
Hohfeldian scheme, the most significant of which is that Hohfeld did
not explain how remedial rights relate to other rights. He explained
how for every right there is a duty, and presumably, this duty would
carry over to remedial rights (i.e., when a court orders a particular
remedy, this constitutes a new duty to which the plaintiff has a correl-
ative right). But Hohfeld did not have a theory for how this secondary
cluster of remedial rights and duties relates to the initial right-duty
cluster. It has been suggested that, in Hohfeldian terms, once a
breach of a legal duty has been found, the court has the power to cre-
ate a new set of jural relations:
It may confirm the original claim-duty relation if this was in dispute, as by an
injunction or an order for specific performance. Or it may substitute another
claim-duty relation, as to pay damages .... A's claim thus exists by virtue of
B's duty, this usually being based on an interest of A's, but is quite indepen-
dent of the legal remedy. 2 0 3
That is, there is a duty not to deny equal protection and a correla-
tive right to equal protection. For example, the violation of the duty
by practicing intentional racial segregation in public schools does
nothing to the existence of the right. The victims of segregation still
have a right to equal protection, even if that right has been violated.
The remedial issue is what duties does the violation of the right to
equal protection give rise to? Hohfeld does not provide us with a way
of discovering what the appropriate remedy would be when a court is
faced with the breach of a duty. Yet, one thing that is clear from the
Supreme Court's desegregation jurisprudence is that the Court has
never held what one might deduce to be a strictly Hohfeldian view of
the remedy, that is, that all the State needs to do is stop
discriminating.
The Court in Green, for example, stated that once intentional seg-
regation was found, school authorities had the duty to transform the
school district into one in which "racial discrimination would be elimi-
nated root and branch."204 The remedial duty has alternatively been
expressed as the requirement that the school district return the plain-
202. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995).
203. Wilson, supra note 194, at 201-02.
204. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
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tiffs to the place they would have been in had there been no discrimi-
nation.20 5 Thus, according to the Court, the breach of the duty not to
deny equal protection gives rise to new and arguably more substantial
duties to eradicate the effects of discrimination. Yet, the Supreme
Court since Brown I has not been explicit and consistent about what
counts as an effect of discrimination. To put this in Hohfeldian terms,
there is no explication of the right that gives rise to and is correlative
with the creation of new remedial duties. Courts recognize the need
for new duties to eradicate the effects of the wrong done to the plain-
tiffs, and they understand that at some level plaintiffs have a "right"
to these duties.20 6 Yet, courts have not explicitly developed a theory
of rights to ground these duties. This lack of clarity may be the result
of judges understanding that the violation of the Equal Protection
Clause gives rise to new duties on the part of the State, yet not under-
standing that the creation of these new duties cannot be coherent un-
less the interests that ground the correlative rights are also
recognized. The failure to acknowledge the new Hohfeldian relation-
ship created at the remedy stage, and the failure to explain the con-
nection between those remedial rights and duties and the rights and
duties from which they arose, has prevented the Court from being able
to articulate principled limits on the scope of its remedial power.
The absence of a theory of how remedial duties relate to the rights
violation to which they give rise highlights another limitation of
Hohfeld's theory: Hohfeld did not have a theory of how rights might
generate duties, and vice versa. Many laws, including the Fourteenth
Amendment, are stated in terms of duties which exist upon their pro-
mulgation, even without the identification of specific correlative
rights. Thus, one could see the distinction between Plessy v. Fergu-
son,
2 0 7 where the Supreme Court upheld the legality of segregation
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and
Brown v. Board of Education, where segregation was found to be ille-
gal under that Clause, as a new understanding of the type of right to
which the duty not to deny equal protection gives rise. 208 That there
could be two such different interpretations of the duty not to deny
205. Id.
206. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) ("The constitutional
right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school
system in that district.").
207. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
208. The Supreme Court in Brown I acknowledged as much, stating, "In approaching
this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth]
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be
determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws." 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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equal protection itself indicates that duties and rights are not simulta-
neously created but may need to be generated from each other in light
of the political and social context. As Joseph Raz has stated:
The existence of a right often leads to holding another to have a duty because
of the existence of certain facts peculiar to the parties or general to the society
in which they live. A change of circumstances may lead to the creation of new
duties based on the old right. 2 0 9
Given the limitations of the Hohfeldian approach, which does not
explain how remedial duties emerge from rights, once a violation of a
duty has been found, we must then turn to a substantive theory of
rights to figure out how to define the scope of the new jural relations
that are created at the remedial stage. This is what Justice Thomas
explicitly resisted in Jenkins III, and what the majority of the Court
has implicitly resisted. The right and duty analysis which allowed the
court to identify the breach of duty must be set aside. Once the viola-
tion is found, the court must then set up a new scheme of jural rela-
tions. That is, it must impose new duties on the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff for the harm and create an institutional
structure where the relevant effects of the violation are eradicated.210
This analysis brings us right back to the fundamental question left
open by Hohfeld, namely, what is the nature of the injury inflicted
when the State violates its duty not to deny equal protection? Even if
we accept that in the context of public schooling, this duty translates
directly into the duty not to discriminate in school assignments solely
on the basis of race (surely an indisputable proposition at this
point 21), we are still left with the question of how to understand this
right such that we can generate appropriate remedial duties when the
right has been violated by the nonperformance of the original duty (in
this case, the intentional segregative acts of the defendant school dis-
tricts and/or State). To put it another way, given the correlativity of
duties and rights, what rights are generated by the Equal Protection
Clause?
If the interests that the duty not to deny equal protection are in-
tended to protect can be identified in a general way, then two impor-
tant things will be accomplished. First, plaintiffs will no longer have
the burden of proving a specific causal link between the defendants'
acts of segregation and the harm suffered. Instead, they will only
have to prove that there was segregation, and that they suffered harm
to those identified interests. Second, there will be a better under-
standing of the nature of the right, thereby allowing courts a more
209. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 171 (1986).
210. See OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 87 (1978).
211. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 ("We have now announced that ... segregation [in
public education] is a denial of the equal protection of the laws."). See generally
Charles Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960).
[Vol. 81:283
2002] TERMINATION OF DESEGREGATION DECREES 333
principled way of crafting remedies to vindicate that right, and also an
understanding of when those duties have achieved success.
The approach suggested above would require the Court to specifi-
cally identify the range of interests protected by the Equal Protection
Clause in the context of public schooling; determine whether the de-
fendants violated the Equal Protection Clause by practicing segrega-
tion; and then, in the termination context, ask whether the plaintiffs
continue to suffer harms to those identified interests. This would shift
the difficulty of proof in desegregation cases from causation to interest
identification. In order to make this shift, however, we need a theory
of rights.
C. Interest Theory of Rights
Joseph Raz sets forth an "Interest Theory" of rights. He states: "X
has a right" if and only if X can have rights; and, other things being
equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason
for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.2 12 In Raz's view,
rights occupy an intermediate place between interests and duties.
The strength and nature of the interest creates the right, and the exis-
tence of the right creates a duty. Rights are the grounds for imposing
duties, and duties are justified by the existence of the right. As Raz
states, "[tihe specific role of rights in practical thinking is, therefore,
the grounding of duties in the interests of other beings."
213
Under the Interest Theory, to say that X has a right is to say that
X's interests would be advanced by the performance of a duty, whether
or not that duty actually exists. Thus, this theory is victim-based be-
cause it looks to the interests of the right-bearer to decide how to as-
sign duties. Rights generate duties, but there is not an exact
correlativity because not all rights have necessarily generated specific
duties at any one time. Hohfeld tells us that duties correlate with
rights, and Raz tells us that those duties are determined by the nature
of the interests that generated the right:
If a duty is based on a right... then it trivially follows that one cannot know
the reasons for it without knowing of the right (or without knowing that the
interest which it protects is sufficient to be the ground of a duty-which is the
definition of a right).2 14
The issue here is not how to derive rights from interests, but rather
how to derive duties from interests, given the pre-existence of a consti-
tutional right. That is, Interest Theory, as a descriptive enterprise,
posits that the language of rights in our system is evidence of the im-
portance that we give to certain interests. As the Supreme Court it-
self noted: "Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a
212. RAz, supra note 209, at 166.
213. Joseph Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 93 MIND 194, 208 (1984).
214. RAZ, supra note 209, at 185.
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vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particu-
lar interests and their contours are shaped by the interests they
protect."215
Rights simplify discourse because we can use rights as a shorthand
for expressing important interests, and we do not have to discuss ulti-
mate values every time a practical question arises. But that does not
mean that we can disregard the fact that these rights are created by
interests in the first place. On the contrary, as Raz formulates it, it is
the nature and content of these interests that tell us what duties are
created by certain rights. 216
The interplay of interests, rights, and duties has been stated in
more formal terms by Raz. Raz envisions a justificatory hierarchy of
interests, core rights, and derivative rights. Core rights are justified
by interests, and derivative rights are justified by core rights. Thus,
my right to personal liberty is a core right, justified by interests in
liberty, freedom, and personal dignity. My derivative right to walk on
my hands (Raz's example) is derived from my right to personal liberty,
even though walking on my hands is only very indirectly justified by
my interest in freedom. That is, it is enough of a justification for my
right to walk on my hands to simply say I have a right to liberty and
non-interference; I do not need to invoke the higher justification of
fundamental interests that ground that core right. On the other hand,
if I want to justify the core right, I must reach back to the interests
that ground that right.217
The ultimate justification for a right is that the interest underlying
that right is important enough to protect, even at the expense of the
general welfare. In a situation where rights and utility conflict, rights
prevail.218 Of course, there may be situations where rights conflict,
215. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
216. RAz, supra note 209, at 181-82.
217. RAZ, supra note 209, at 168-70. Dworkin posits a similar hierarchy of rights, al-
though he analyzes the justificatory process, as it is undertaken by judges, in
much greater detail. Dworkin contends that specific legal rights are recognized
through the interpretation of past precedent in light of principles of justice, fair-
ness, and procedural due process. A judge recognizes a novel legal right by inter-
preting past decisions with an eye toward consistency, as if all of the law had
been written by one consistent, fair, just author. The declaration of a right, if
derived through this process of integrity, is the result of a construction of legal
practice in its best light. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
218. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights As Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984). Dworkin calls rights trumps, but Dworkin is not an interest
theorist. Rather, he views rights as necessary to trump utility in situations
where there is a high likelihood that without them, the majority preference might
be driven by unacceptable motives, such as racial bias. RONALD DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-239 (1978). As Jeremy Waldron explains, rights are
necessary to exclude certain reasons for public action, not for "the immunization
of particular interests for their own sake." Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin's
Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 301, 304 (2000).
[Vol. 81:283
2002] TERMINATION OF DESEGREGATION DECREES 335
in which case a utilitarian calculation might be necessary as one
method of resolving the conflict, but such a calculation only becomes
available after the acknowledgment that there are fundamental inter-
ests conflicting with each other, not fundamental interests conflicting
with other interests. 219 As Jeremy Waldron put it, "there are certain
losses whose infliction on individuals in the resolution of political con-
flict is morally unacceptable. That is, there are certain losses that
people should not have to run the risk of suffering when they agree to
be bound by the democratic process." 2 20
To say rights trump utility, however, is not to say that conflicts
between rights and other interests will necessarily be conflicts be-
tween the interests of the individual and the interests of society. The
justification for individual rights must be understood, according to
Raz, as both the interest of the individual and the common good.221
The existence of a right might point not only to the value society has
placed on an individual interest, but also the value society under-
stands this interest to have for the common good. The right to free
speech, for example, protects an interest in open political discussion,
something one cannot do alone, and something that many would agree
benefits society in general, not just the individuals engaged in a politi-
cal dialogue.
Rights are unique, according to Raz, because they have enough
force and importance to ground duties and to define the scope of those
duties by virtue of the interest and the respect due to them. 22 2 In
order to determine what duties arise out of a certain right under the
Interest Theory, we have to look backward to the values and interests
that generate the right, and forward to the circumstances within
which duties are created, thus taking into account "conflicting consid-
erations." 22 3 The Interest Theory of rights tells us that rights are the
concretization of certain fundamental interests, and that the naming
of those rights does not necessarily correlate with any specific duties.
Thus, not every right gives rise to a particular duty, or all of the duties
that could promote its justificatory interests. Rather, it only gives rise
to those duties that are sufficiently free from conflicting considera-
tions. 2 24 Thus, one can have rights, or believe in rights, without being
clear about what the duty is and whose duty it is.
Waldron has elaborated on this point, arguing that any particular
right creates "waves of duties":
219. See REX MARTIN, RAWLS AND RIGHTS 1-10 (1985).
220. Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense Upon Stilts?-A Reply, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS:
BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 202-03 (1987).
221. Joseph Raz, Rights and Politics, 71 IND. L.J. 27, 39 (1995).
222. See RAz, supra note 209, at 249.
223. Waldron, supra note 220, at 198.
224. Id. at 182.
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We talk about rights when we think that some interest of an individual has
sufficient moral importance to justify holding others to be under a duty to
serve it. But if a given interest has that degree of importance, it is unlikely
that it will justify the imposition of just one duty. Interests are complicated
things. There are many ways in which a given interest can be served or dis-
served, and we should not expect to find that only one of those ways is singled
out and made the subject matter of a duty. 2 2 5
Waldron's elaboration of the Interest Theory provides a connection
that Hohfeld's theory did not: between the initial right and the duties
to which its violation might give rise. Waldron gives the example of
the right not to be tortured. The obvious correlative duty would be a
duty not to torture, but Waldron goes farther and demonstrates that it
might also create, for example, a duty to educate people about the
wrongfulness of torture, as well as a need to monitor situations where
torture is likely. 2 26 Most important for these purposes, however, is
that Waldron also recognized that remedial duties are generated by
the right and its underlying interest. Still concerned with the torture
example, Waldron writes:
In the case of each of these duties, the argument for imposing it is traced back,
via the complexities of political life, to the concern for an individual interest
that underpinned the right in the first place: we say that the right protects a
basic human interest and that in the current circumstances of human life one
cannot be said to take that interest seriously if one is content to stop at the
previous wave of duty and not worry about anything further.... [F]or our
conception of the interest will operate as a normative resource base from
which a whole array of moral requirements can be developed. 2 27
The Interest Theory of rights has many attributes that might
prove useful in thinking analytically about rights in the context of
school desegregation litigation and remedies. First, the theory posits
that as a descriptive matter, rights are reflections of interests that are
valued highly enough to justify their precedence when they conflict
with other interests. Second, duties correlate with rights not on a one-
to-one basis, but rather in an ongoing process of dynamic genera-
tion.2 28 It follows, then, that in order to understand what duty is ap-
propriate to vindicate a particular right, one must understand the
interests that ground that right. Third, in understanding those inter-
ests, one must consider not only individual interests, but also inter-
ests that society in general might have that justify the right. Fourth,
the creation of duties based on those interests must take into account
not only the interests, but also the context in which the duty will be
created and carried out.
225. Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-
1991, 212 (1993).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 213.
228. See id. at 303.
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A few caveats are in order before proceeding to analyze school de-
segregation jurisprudence with the aid of rights theory. First, the in-
terests that justify rights do not cover the field of morality. The
Interest Theory of rights is intended to be descriptive of legal, not
moral, rights, although of course there will be some overlap. Related
to this caveat, it must also be understood that this analysis should not
fall victim to the naturalistic fallacy: the attempt to get an "ought"
from an "is." The Interest Theory of rights is an attempt to describe
legal rights accurately, to jibe with our intuition of what we mean
when we talk about rights. The Interest Theory does not tell us which
interests ought to generate rights and duties, and it does not tell us
which specific interests have generated rights and duties. The utility
of the theory is that it alerts us to the fact that in talking about rights,
we are talking about intermediate conclusions, conclusions about the
value of certain interests. But if the task is to generate duties based
on a right, as it is for courts trying to create remedies in school deseg-
regation cases, then one must look beyond these intermediate conclu-
sions to the interests that ground them. The next section of this
Article attempts to do this by exploring what courts say about rights
and duties, and trying to glean from that the underlying values and
interests at stake. This is the first and most important step in the
creation of effective remedies which would then carry with them the
standard for judging their success and failure. It is also an acknowl-
edgement of the historical fact that equitable remedies give rise to
rights. 22 9 Thus, in looking at the desegregation jurisprudence of the
past forty years in light of the Interest Theory of rights, some clarify-
ing principles may emerge that can in turn be applied to future cases.
D. Rights Theory Applied
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."23 0 This is, to put it mildly,
"exceedingly abstract moral language."23 1 In the Hohfeldian spirit,
the Supreme Court has understood this statement of a negative duty
to create a right in any person within the State's jurisdiction to equal
protection of the laws. As Justice Strong recognized over one hundred
years ago:
229. See Levinson, supra note 136, at 887. The attempt to identify relevant interests
by examining the remedial duties developed by the Supreme Court could be char-
acterized as a Dworkinian exercise in post interpretive/reforming analysis. That
is, to interpret the law as it stands in order to better understand its underlying
principles so as to then apply them more effectively in the future. See generally
DWORKIN, supra note 218, at 45-86.
230. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
231. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 7 (1996).
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The words of the [Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth] [A]mendment, it
is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive
immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,-exemption
from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discrimina-
tions which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race.
2 3 2
This equally abstract right, derived from the duty, must then be
translated into something meaningful in order to function as a legal
rule. Raz would contend that as a core right, that is, a right that is not
derived from other rights but stands on its own as an expression of
fundamental interests, the right to equal protection of the laws serves
a justificatory function for derivative rights. 23 3 One of these deriva-
tive rights, as Justice Strong points out, is the right to be exempt from
racially discriminatory legislation.
If we accept the Hohfeldian description of the correlativity of rights
and duties, and the descriptive power of the Interest Theory which
holds that interests form the basis for rights, rights form the basis for
duties, and interests therefore form the basis for duties, then we must
understand the Equal Protection Clause as creating a right that re-
flects certain fundamental interests. Assuming that the goal of any
remedy is to put the plaintiff back in the position she would have occu-
pied in the absence of the violation, or at least try to rectify the loss
resulting from the violation, then in crafting remedial duties to vindi-
cate rights violations, courts must understand the nature of those in-
terests in order to restore them.234 If this is true, then we ought to
find in cases in which courts are called upon to create or evaluate rem-
edies arising out of a breach of the duty not to deny equal protection,
that they look to the interests that gave rise to the duty not to deny
equal protection.
Perhaps surprisingly, there are not very many appellate cases that
explicitly discuss the nature of the right to equal protection in the con-
text of school segregation. Because the Equal Protection Clause is
stated in terms of a negative duty (no State shall deny), the violation
of the right is dependent upon proof of the violation of the duty. Plain-
tiffs who bring desegregation cases must prove that the defendants
232. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879); accord Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (recognizing a constitutional right of children "not to be
discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color.").
233. RAz, supra note 209, at 168-70.
234. As Abram Chayes put it, "[r]elief is ... an effort to devise a program to contain
future consequences in a way that accommodates the range of interests involved."
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1294 (1976); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits on Judicial Power
in Ordering Remedies, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 111 (1991) ("[T]he choice
of remedy follows from the choice of objective. That choice is substantive.").
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breached this negative duty (i.e., denied them equal protection) by
practicing intentional discrimination. 23 5 This focuses the burden of
production on bringing forth enough evidence to prove intentional dis-
crimination.236 Although a discriminatory purpose can sometimes
only be proven by its effects, even in these types of cases, the effects
examined are usually issues of racial balance among the students, and
sometimes faculty, in a particular school district. 23 7 Thus, a history
of officially segregated schools, coupled with the absence of affirmative
steps having been taken to correct that segregation after such laws
were proclaimed to be illegal by the Supreme Court in Brown I, and a
determination that the current imbalance can be traced back to the
official segregation, were usually enough to justify a finding of inten-
tional discrimination and a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 238 Thus, at the liability stage of most desegregation cases, the
focus has been on proving intentional discrimination by the school dis-
trict, not in defining the scope of the right not to be denied equal pro-
tection of the laws.
There is of course, a notable exception in Brown I. In Brown I, the
Court first recognized that intentional segregation was a denial of
equal protection, and it had to explain why. The Court did this by
examining the interests which ground the duty not to deny equal pro-
tection in order to establish the contours and proper interpretation of
that duty.
The issue in Brown I was whether the doctrine of "separate but
equal" was applicable to public education. The Court assumed that
the segregated schools the plaintiffs attended were essentially equal
in terms of what the Court called "tangible factors," such as buildings,
curricula, and qualifications and salaries of teachers. 239 Thus, in de-
ciding that segregation was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court looked instead to "the effect of segregation itself on public
education."240 The effect on black children, according to the Court,
was "a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone."2 4 1 This sense of inferiority was
found to affect motivation, to retard emotional development, and to
deprive the black children of benefits they would otherwise enjoy. 24 2
235. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("The essential element of de
jure segregation is 'a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional
state action.'" (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205)).
236. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201.
237. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
238. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
239. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 494.
242. Id.
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Looking solely at the Brown I Court's discussion of the nature of
the right to equal protection, there appear to be two relevant interests.
There is an interest in equal educational opportunity (once the State
decides to provide an education). There is also an interest in being
free from state action that carries the message of inferiority (what is
referred to as stigma). This latter interest is really just an interest in
being treated respectfully by the State. 243
Thus, the Court found that the State could be violating the Equal
Protection Clause either when it distributed benefits unequally be-
cause of race, or when it provided equal but separate treatment when
there was no reason other than race for the separation. The latter
point is inferred from the Court's statement that segregated schools
are "inherently unequal."24 4 In this way, the Brown I Court tied the
definition of the violation directly to the interests of the plaintiffs by
defining the violation not simply in comparative terms (i.e., whether
they were treating the plaintiffs equally to white children), but also in
noncomparative terms which took into account the perspective of the
plaintiffs, the right-bearers.245 The inequality between the white and
black schools during segregation was not only in how benefits were
distributed but also in how each race understood the segregation, the
effect that the segregation had on their "hearts and minds." This was
why separate could never be equal.2 46
243. DWORKIN, supra note 218, at 227; cf. Linda R. Meyer, Unruly Rights, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1, 14-16 (2000).
244. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
245. Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, in JUSTICE: SELECTED READINGS (Joel
Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1977). Joel Feinberg draws a distinction between
comparative and noncomparative justice that is helpful in understanding the
Brown I decision. According to Feinberg, some determinations of justice depend
on making comparisons between people. "When the occasion for justice is the
distribution of divisible but limited goods ... how much will be left for the others
is always pertinent to the question of how much it would be just for any particu-
lar individual to get." Id. at 56. Justice can also take a noncomparative form,
where someone can be treated unjustly without reference to anyone else. Fein-
berg focuses on what he calls the "justice ofjudgments." Id. at 57. Injustice arises
in this context when someone is wrongly judged, that is, the judgment about
them is either wrong in reference to the truth (e.g., the falsely accused) or is
derogatory without basis in fact. See id. Segregation was a comparative injustice
because black and white students did not get the same education, particularly if
one includes access to opportunity as one of the benefits of an education. Segre-
gation was also a noncomparative injustice because it was a judgmental injustice,
that is, it made a wrong and unfair judgment about African-American chil-
dren-that their skin color indicated something about their mental and moral
worthiness. As Feinberg states, the injustice in the judgment "consists precisely
in the falsity of the derogatory allegation." Id. The injustice of this does not de-
pend in any way on how someone else is judged.
246. The Court has been criticized for its use of social science evidence to buttress its
finding that segregation has an adverse effect on the psyches of black children.
See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment seems simply to protect an
interest in equality, the Court in Brown I indicated that it protects
another interest as well: the interest in being treated respectfully by
the State. The Brown I Court revealed this dual nature of the Four-
teenth Amendment in its discussion of the unconstitutionality of "sep-
arate but equal." The Equal Protection Clause instructs us how to
protect whatever interests the government is taking seriously. In the
context of public education, therefore, it tells us that if the govern-
ment decides to provide an education, it must do so equally (at least as
far as racial distinctions are concerned). Thus, when equality oper-
ates in the context of scarce resources, it is simple to understand its
meaning, viz, those resources must be distributed equally. Yet, the
Brown I Court, in assuming for the purpose of its decision that the
segregated schools at issue were equal as to all tangible goods, recog-
nized another interest implicit in the equal protection guarantee: the
interest in being treated respectfully by the government. And the par-
ticular nature of that interest is not a function of scarce resources.
This second, noncomparative conception of equality goes beyond
notions of formal equality to a recognition that, in some circum-
stances, the concept of equality is really a stand-in for concepts of
rights, and rights are determined by interests. As Peter Weston has
explained, the idea of equality is circular if it is understood to stand
for the idea that like people should be treated alike. That is, equality
is a truth because it is a tautology. 24 7 The underlying issue in
noncomparative equality analyses is the determination of qualities
which are relevant for treating people differently. In what way
should people be considered alike for the purposes of the distribution
of certain goods, and then to what goods are they all entitled: "When
several people qualify under a principle the principle generates equal-
HARV. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1959). These criticisms have been amply addressed by
those simply pointing out that all one needs to do is take judicial notice of society
in order to understand that one of the purposes of segregation was to insinuate
the inferiority of blacks, and that the message was duly absorbed by many. See,
e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1, 9 (1976) (noting the "plain fact" that the meaning of segregation
was to put blacks in a position of inferiority); Charles Lawrence, "One More River
to Cross"-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New
Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
50-56 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980). Richard Klugar persuasively demonstrates that
the footnote to social science evidence was included as a way of dismissing the
claim made in Plessy that any feelings of inferiority were self-imposed by black
school children and not the direct result of segregation. See RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 705-07 (Special ed. 1994). This method of in-
directly criticizing the reasoning in Plessy has itself been criticized.
247. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982).
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ity of rights, but that is entirely fortuitous. A person's right would be
the same were he the only one to hold a right under the principle."248
Thus, in situations where scarcity of resources is not at issue, the
use of the term "equality" is rhetorical because it simply serves to re-
inforce the right to a benefit that is conferred by a particular underly-
ing principle.249 The Brown I Court appears to have understood this.
The Court assumed that black and white children are alike for the
purposes of public schooling, that is, skin color signified nothing rele-
vant to the means and ends of public schooling. The problem with
segregation was that it constituted a failure to treat black citizens as
they deserved to be treated because segregation stigmatized them by
taking race into account in school assignments and then denied them
educational opportunity by favoring the white schools. This is why
the Court found that intentionally segregated schools could never be
equal because they always signified the mistreatment of black chil-
dren. Similarly, Weston argues that the substance of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is that blacks have a right to be free from certain kinds
of wrongs. He then goes on to make the point to which this Article is
addressed: "Significantly, the courts have thus far failed to identify
the precise sort of injury that the substance of the Equal Protection
Clause is designed to prohibit, a failure that may itself result from the
fact that the clause is stated in the language of equality."250 In fact,
the Supreme Court, in the context of segregation, did identify this sort
of injury as psychological harm resulting from receiving the message
of inferiority from the State; it just never indicated how that injury
would be remedied.
The Supreme Court has identified two different interests protected
by the Equal Protection Clause in the context of primary and secon-
dary education. The first is the interest in equal treatment, the sub-
stance of which (i.e., education, resources, etc.) must be tied to what
other people are getting. The second is an interest in respectful and
dignified treatment and is independent of scarcity concerns. By 1954,
it was simply undeniable that this second interest was violated by ra-
cial segregation. 251 This dual justification for the violation is crucial
to analyzing desegregation remedies because it points to two different
effects of segregation that must be remedied, and that if not remedied,
should count as vestiges of discrimination for the purposes of deter-
mining whether a remedy should be terminated.
248. RAz, supra note 209, at 225.
249. See id. at 228. Raz argues at the same time, however, that in conditions of scar-
city, equality has some independent meaning. If there is a scarce resource, then
it is meaningful to say that it should be divided up equally. What one is entitled
to in that situation is dependent on what everyone else is getting. As such, equal-
ity becomes a "principle of conflict resolution." Id. at 223-25.
250. Westen, supra note 247, at 567.
251. See Lawrence, supra note 246, at 50-56.
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Once the Supreme Court recognized and explained the Fourteenth
Amendment right not to be forced into racially segregated schools in
Brown I, the Court rarely considered it necessary to return to the un-
derlying, interest-based justification in subsequent cases. One possi-
ble explanation of this is given by Raz, who believes that the
authoritative declaration of the right "puts a distance between the
right and the interest it serves" insofar as the justification for the duty
was in part that a legitimate authority said so.252 Like other rights,
the right to equal protection is an intermediate point between inter-
ests and duties and serves as a justification for the grounding of duties
in others. Once an interest has been elevated to the status of right, it
is not necessary to reach back to the interests that grounded the right:
the existence of the right itself indicates that important interests are
at stake and that others' duties can be justified if based on that
right.253
Thus, after Brown I, courts did not need to consult the plaintiffs'
interests to define the scope of the violation, all they had to do was use
the test the Court had established to identify the violation, that is, the
finding of intentional segregation. 254 Because in the cases immedi-
ately following Brown I it was not difficult to find that the defendants
were practicing or had recently practiced intentional discrimination,
the focus after Brown I shifted to the question of what remedy was
sufficient to cure the violation.
According to the Court, the ultimate goal of any remedy for inten-
tional segregation on the basis of race is a "racially nondiscriminatory
school system," 255 which it coupled with "the personal interest of the
plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a
nondiscriminatory basis."256
Thus, in its first foray into the remedial stage of desegregation liti-
gation, the Court set out a vague standard open to much interpreta-
tion. It defined the remedial duty as the creation of a "racially
nondiscriminatory school system."25 7 This could be broadly read to
mean that the school system must be free of all the effects of discrimi-
nation that were created by the prior practice of segregation even after
it had ceased. It could also be read in a more narrow way by under-
standing "nondiscriminatory school system" to simply mean a system
where no officials practiced intentional segregation. Which interpre-
tation of the remedial duty one adopts reflects, or creates, a different
understanding of the nature of the plaintiffs' interests at stake. That
252. RAz, supra note 209, at 262.
253. See id. at 180.
254. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7 (1971).
255. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
256. Id. at 300.
257. Id. at 301.
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is, under the first interpretation, there is an assumption that the
plaintiffs' right to equal protection is meant to protect interests not
only in not being told that they must go to a school that is racially
segregated, but also an interest in going to a school that is free from
any racially discriminatory effects. Under the more narrow reading of
the Court's standard, the plaintiffs' interests would include only the
former. Interestingly, the Court's attempt to state the remedial stan-
dard in terms of the plaintiffs' interests adopted the narrower reading,
that the interest of the plaintiffs was in "admission to public schools
as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis."258 This seems to
imply that the plaintiffs' right extends only to "blind admissions."
By looking at these opinions, we can see how the seeds of confusion
were sown at the earliest stage of desegregation jurisprudence. On
the one hand, the Court recognized in Brown I that there were a num-
ber of serious harms stemming from state-compelled racial segrega-
tion of school children, including lack of educational opportunity and
stigma. But in Brown II, where the Court set out remedial standards,
albeit in broad generalizations, the Court had already moved away
from recognizing the nature of the remedial duty in terms of the inter-
ests that grounded the initial duty (the duty not to deny equal protec-
tion), and was operating at the level of what Raz would call "derivative
rights." That is, the Court, having established the right not to be the
victim of State-imposed segregation, was now thinking about the duty
only in terms of that right, not in terms of the interests that grounded
it. In contemplating a remedy, the Court was more concerned, in
Dworkinian terms, with the determination of "the secondary rights
people have to the method and manner of enforcing their primary sub-
stantive rights."259
Had the Court made the interest-duty connection more explicit at
the time it decided Brown II, it might have recognized that the pri-
mary purpose of the remedial duty was to eliminate the stigma and
create equal educational opportunities among schools, and that racial
mixing, from a constitutional standpoint, was secondary. The Justices
may have imagined that by desegregating the schools through neutral
student assignments, the underlying interests of the plaintiffs would
eventually also be vindicated, but even this is not clear.260 What is
258. Id. Various Justices have argued that the narrow reading is the appropriate one.
See Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
259. DWORKIN, supra note 219, at 390 (1986); see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (noting
that the remedy must "repair the denial of a constitutional right" and "correct the
condition that offends the constitution").
260. For example, in Keyes, Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, argued that the
'original meaning" of Brown I was "essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the States ... to force children to attend segregated
schools." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 220.
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clear is that the Justices were once again bent on presenting a unani-
mous opinion, and were themselves unsure of how enforcement of
their historic decision should proceed.26 1 The necessity of integration
was not only the view of the Brown plaintiffs, but also the view of
some district court judges as well. Judge Robert L. Carter, one of the
lead attorneys in Brown I, believed at the time that "[i]ntegrated edu-
cation appeared to be an indispensable means to equal education. In-
deed, to us, equal education meant integrated education."26 2 Judge
Wisdom stated that the Brown decisions demonstrated the "overriding
right of Negroes as a class to a completely integrated public educa-
tion."263 Nevertheless, the failure to be explicit about this permitted
the debate about the scope of the remedy to stray from its grounding
in the plaintiffs' interests. As Gary Orfield put it: "The [Brown I] deci-
sion established a revolutionary principle in a society that had been
overtly racist for most of its history. But the statement of principle
was separated from the commitment to implementation, and the im-
plementation procedures turned out not to work."
2 64
Because the Court after Brown came to focus on the remedy rather
than the nature of the right, it is from the remedies that the actual
contours of the right, its "cash value" can be understood. 26 5 David
Kirp contends that these desegregation decisions "required a different
reasoning process, which defines the wrong by inspecting what is re-
quired by way of remedy."26 6 But, as Part II of this Article demon-
strated, there was nothing new or different about that reasoning
process. Decisions in equity historically began with the remedy from
which, after a while, the contours of the right could be discerned. The
difference was that in modern desegregation jurisprudence, there are
two sources for understanding the nature of the wrong: the posited
right itself (equal protection) and the remedy invented to protect it
(variations on court-ordered school desegregation with an emphasis on
racial balance).
The second category of desegregation cases where the Court might
reveal its conception of the underlying interests of the plaintiffs are
those involving the propriety and legality of proposed remedies. What
do discussions about the remedial duty in desegregation jurisprudence
tell us about the judicial conception of the underlying interests of the
261. KLUGER, supra note 246, at 739-47.
262. Robert L. Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 22 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
263. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 868 (5th Cir. 1966).
264. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 7 (1996).
265. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 887 (1999). This observation, however, does not provide any
clue as to how a court faced with a violation ought to approach the question of
remedy.
266. DAVID L. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS 52 (1982).
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plaintiffs? Although the interests themselves are rarely discussed ex-
plicitly in the cases, the assumption of the Interest Theory of rights is
that interests ground the rights and duties that correlate with them.
If a remedy is ordered to compensate for the violation of a constitu-
tional right, then the remedy should, according to this theory, be di-
rected at vindicating the interests that ground the constitutional
right.
The Supreme Court developed a variety of standards for the crea-
tion of desegregation remedies, some more specific than others. These
are relevant to the present inquiry because they too might provide
some indication of the nature of the interests at stake. Its first major
statement of the remedial standard came in Green v. County School
Board,267 where the Court stated two remedial goals based on Brown
H. The immediate goal was to eliminate the exclusion of black chil-
dren from white schools, and the "ultimate goal" was to bring about a
"unitary, nonracial system of public education."268 Such a system was
necessary "to remedy the established unconstitutional deficiencies of
its segregated system."269 Thus, the Green Court's language tracked
the standards set out in Brown H and made clear that the words "ra-
cially nondiscriminatory school system" in Brown H should be read
broadly to include something in addition to nondiscriminatory school
assignments. The Green Court understood the problem as systemic,
"well-entrenched," and not able to be remedied by simply opening the
doors of white schools to blacks and vice-versa: "School boards such as
the respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were
nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."270
The fulfillment of this duty, the Court held, was required by the con-
stitutional rights of the plaintiffs.
The Court's first attempt to amplify the Green standards came in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.271 In this case,
the Court approved of the limited use of mathematical ratios as a
"starting point" toward desegregating the school district.272 It held
that children could be transported by bus to schools in order to achieve
desegregation, as long as the time or distance traveled did not "either
risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educa-
tional process."273 The Court also allowed for the existence of all
267. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
268. Id. at 435-36.
269. Id. at 437.
270. Id. at 437-38.
271. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
272. There is no constitutional right, however, to a particular degree of racial balance.
See id. at 24; Pasadena City Bd. ofEduc. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976).
273. Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31.
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black schools in the context of an otherwise desegregated system, as
long as the district could demonstrate that the composition of the
schools, was not the result of discrimination.
These early cases, along with a host of others, discussed the reme-
dial duty primarily as a duty to desegregate, that is, to stop discrimi-
nating in school assignments on the basis of race, and to take
affirmative steps to create some racial mixing in the schools. Unitary
was thus described as a system where "no person is to be effectively
excluded from any school because of race or color." 27 4 The duty to
make a transition to a nondiscriminatory school system first stated in
Brown II, was interpreted as a duty to see to it that black and white
kids, wherever "reasonable, feasible, and workable," went to school to-
gether.27 5 Thus, remedies were focused on transportation (busing),
minority to majority transfer plans,2 76 alteration of attendance
zones, 277 school construction, 278 and the temporary use of racial quo-
tas.27 9 Yet, doubt as to the sufficiency of these remedies lingered. For
example, in Swann, after approving of the district court's plan which
included busing, temporary racial quotas, and the rearrangement of
attendance zones, the Court said that the defendant school system
would be unitary when it achieved full compliance with the Court's
decision in Brown J.280 It is significant that the Court understood the
standard for compliance to be Brown I, not Brown I. Is this an indica-
tion that, in addition to being a clear rejection as inadequate of "all
deliberate speed,"281 the Court understood that stigma and educa-
tional opportunity were the true interests at stake? Swann also was
the first case to state the object of desegregation as the elimination of
"all vestiges of state-imposed segregation" from the public schools. 28 2
If we analyze the Swann remedies in terms of the plaintiffs' inter-
ests, there is a narrow and a broad way of looking at them. Narrowly,
these remedies seem to vindicate an interest by black school children
in going to school with white school children, coupled with an interest
in not being the subjects of intentional discriminatory school assign-
ments. More broadly, one could see the interest in going to school with
white children as a proxy for an interest in educational opportunity,
assuming that the only realistic way that black children are going to
get the same opportunity as white children is if they are served to-
gether. And one could further view the interest in not being the sub-
274. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
275. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31.
276. See id. at 26.
277. See id. at 28.
278. See id. at 21.
279. See id. at 25; Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976).
280. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31.
281. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
282. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
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jects of intentional discriminatory school assignments as an interest
in being free from stigma. But if there is a relationship between the
broad and narrow understanding of how the remedies vindicate the
plaintiffs' interests, it must be based on some empirical fact, that is,
that going to school with white children will in fact provide the black
children with a better education than they would get in a segregated
school, and that by ceasing discriminatory assignments, the black
children will no longer experience stigma. If this connection cannot be
established, then the remedies approved in Swann may not be the
best method of achieving compliance with Brown I. By the same to-
ken, the only way to determine whether this connection is established
is by explicitly recognizing the primacy of the interests at stake and
using them as the reference point for the justification of remedial
duties.
The racial mixing approach to desegregation is just one aspect of
the way in which the Court has sought to achieve compliance with
Brown I. In addition to a remedy involving pupil assignments, the
Court has placed an affirmative obligation on defendant school dis-
tricts to remove the effects of intentional discrimination. This re-
quirement has been stated in a variety of ways, including that the
desegregation decree must be designed so as to restore the victims to
the position they would have occupied in the absence of intentional
segregation (i.e., to make them "whole" again); that the federal courts
are within their equitable authority when attempting to cure condi-
tions that flowed from the original violation; and that the remedy is
determined by the nature and scope of the violation.283 Thus, under
this effects test, the Court has approved judicial decrees requiring the
desegregation of faculty and staff,284 remedial education programs, 28 5
and in-service training for faculty and staff.2 86
Although the Supreme Court does not discuss the details of these
remedies, when it has approved them, there is usually a district court
opinion which lays out the rationale for how particular remedies are
intended to eliminate the effects of discrimination. These opinions fo-
cus primarily on educational opportunity. For example, the district
court opinion in Milliken made the remedy-interest connection ex-
plicit. Relying on Brown I, the court emphasized that it was educa-
tional components that were necessary to remedy the effects of past
discrimination. These components included in-service training, coun-
283. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-82. In other words, "federal-court decrees exceed
appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not vio-
late the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation." Id. at 282.
284. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
285. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 284-87 (citing numerous district and appellate cases
which had approved remedial education programs).
286. Id. at 286.
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seling, curriculum design, testing, and remedial reading.28 7 The court
acknowledged the psychological damage that can result from segrega-
tion and recognized that it was more the perception of educational ine-
qualities than of one race schools that created this damage. 288
The district court also noted that the justification for the desegre-
gation order was the educational and psychological damage suffered
by black children in segregated schools, and the court went on to eval-
uate its own remedial guidelines in light of how they would impact
these factors. 28 9 In addition to proposing the transportation of black
children to identifiably white schools in order to eliminate all racially
identifiable white schools, the court focused on restoring quality and
equality to all of the schools in the system through a variety of educa-
tional components, including remedial reading programs, in-service
training, vocational education, and fairer testing procedures. These
measures were all intended to assure those previously "deprived of
equal opportunity by past discrimination.., that the injury from seg-
regation, sometimes intangible, will be eradicated." 290
Although not as explicitly as in Brown I, some of the cases that
have evaluated the adequacy of proposed remedies, when they discuss
interests at all, do return to the interest in educational opportunity
and the interest in being free from stigma. Two things have confused
their analysis, however, and prevented those identified interests from
becoming the touchstones of termination jurisprudence. First, the Su-
preme Court has not explicitly stated that the interest analysis is key
to creating remedies. As a number of Justices have pointed out in con-
curring and dissenting opinions, it is not clear what a "vestige" of dis-
crimination is or how a court should go about identifying one.
2 9 1
Second, the Court's language is very ambiguous as to how a district
court is to measure the plaintiffs' interests against competing inter-
ests, such as local control over school districts.
The other place where one can find explicit recognition of the inter-
est-remedy connection in the context of evaluating proposed remedies
is in concurring and dissenting opinions of individual justices, particu-
larly Justice Thurgood Marshall. Not surprisingly, since he was one
287. Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1118 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
288. Id. at 1131. The court articulated the damage is the "devastating psychological
impact upon black children of the knowledge that they are being excluded from
white schools." Id. at 1132.
289. Id. at 1131. The court noted that in a predominantly black district, to scatter
whites throughout the district just to get some racial mixing "assumes that there
is some divining grace in being white," which was demeaning to blacks, and that
a desegregation plan rather "must be based upon constitutional and equitable
rights of individual students and upon the educational goals that desegregation
seeks to attain." Id.
290. Id. at 1147.
291. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of the lead lawyers who argued Brown I, Justice Marshall believed
that the touchstone for evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of
a desegregation remedy was the interests of the right-bearers, and
saw the significance of plaintiffs' interests in evaluating remedies.
Justice Marshall offered up a strong version of this view in his dis-
sent in Milliken I. The majority of the Supreme Court in that case
struck down the district court's order for the desegregation of the De-
troit school system because the order included school districts outside
of Detroit even though there was no allegation that those school dis-
tricts had practiced intentional segregation. The Court held that in
the absence of a violation by the suburban districts, the order includ-
ing them in the remedy violated the equitable maxim that the scope of
the violation determines the scope of the remedy.2 92 One of Mar-
shall's responses to this theory was that the State of Michigan was in
fact implicated in the segregation of the Detroit public schools, which
should have opened up the way for more expansive remedies. More
significantly for these purposes, however, was his contention that the
goal of the remedy was to vindicate the plaintiffs' rights and that once
a constitutional violation had been found, the district court's equitable
power extended as far as necessary to accomplish that goal. 2 9 3 Justice
Marshall's focus in his Milliken I dissent was on the fact that racially
identifiable schools were a direct effect of intentional segregation and
there was no way to eliminate racially identifiable schools without in-
cluding suburban districts. Thus, he understood the "scope of the vio-
lation" to refer to the extent to which the plaintiffs had been harmed
by the defendants' conduct, whereas the majority in Milliken I under-
stood it to refer to the extent of the defendants' conduct.2 94
Such a fundamental disagreement over how to define a constitu-
tional violation stems directly from the acceptance of the Hohfeldian
scheme of the correlativity of rights and duties and the absence of a
theory of how remedial duties fit into that scheme. If rights and du-
ties are correlatives, then when thinking about remedies, one has a
292. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 757 (1974).
293. Id. at 800 n.19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("While a finding of state action is of
course a prerequisite to finding a violation, we have never held that after uncon-
stitutional state action has been shown, the District Court at the remedial stage
must engage in a second inquiry to determine whether additional state action
exists to justify a particular remedy.").
294. In another dissent in Milliken I, Justice White also decried the majority's "arbi-
trary" limits on federal equitable powers and tried to refocus the issue on the
violation of the plaintiffs' rights, calling the majority's approach "unresponsive to
the goal of attaining the utmost actual desegregation." Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at
781 (White, J., dissenting). The remedial limitation that an intradistrict violation
cannot be corrected by an interdistrict remedy permits "the party responsible for
the constitutional violation to contain the remedial powers of the federal court
within administrative boundaries over which the transgressor itself has plenary
power." Id. at 772.
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choice whether to focus on the right or focus on the duty. If the right
to equal protection is the correlative of the duty not to deny equal pro-
tection, then when analyzing a situation involving intentional racial
discrimination in school assignments, one can either begin by seeing it
as a breach of the duty or as a violation of the right. Which one is
chosen makes a difference as to how one views the remedy. If the situ-
ation is primarily viewed as a failure to fulfill a duty, then the logical
remedy is the fulfillment of the duty: in this case to stop intentionally
discriminating. If the situation is primarily viewed as a violation of a
right, then the logical remedy is to figure out how to restore that right
to the right-bearer. The Supreme Court, in recognizing the need to
eradicate the lingering effects of segregation as well as to cease dis-
criminating has acknowledged both perspectives, but has failed to ex-
plain the basis of the right-bearer's viewpoint. In addition to the
practical implications of the failure of the Court, at least in its major-
ity opinions, to refer back to the underlying interests identified in
Brown, jurisprudential implications began to surface once the termi-
nation cases began to be litigated. This is the third group of desegre-
gation cases to be examined.
To date, there are three cases that have reached the Supreme
Court where the question of termination or partial termination of a
school desegregation remedy has been directly addressed: Board of
Education v. Dowell,2 9 5 Freeman v. Pitts,296 and Missouri v. Jenkins
(Jenkins III).297 In all three cases, the Court has attempted to articu-
late the standard that must be met before a court can terminate all or
some of its supervision over a desegregation remedy. In Dowell the
Court set the standard for when a court may terminate its jurisdiction
over a school district. The school district must have complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree, and the vestiges of past discrimi-
nation have to be eliminated "to the extent practicable."2 98 In deter-
mining whether vestiges remain, the district court must look to what
have become known as the Green factors: faculty, staff, transporta-
tion, extra-curricular activities, and facilities.2 99 In Freeman, the
Court made clear that the Green factors must be examined to see if
they are free from racial discrimination. 30 0 But the Court also hear-
kened back to the interests identified in Brown I and Swann and held
that the goal of the segregation remedy was "to ensure that the princi-
pal wrong of the dejure system, the injuries and stigma inflicted upon
the race disfavored by the violation, is no longer present."30 1 The
295. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
296. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
297. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
298. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
299. See id. at 250 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
300. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 486.
301. Id. at 485.
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Freeman Court emphasized the breadth and flexibility of equity and
understood the primary limitation on federal equity power as causa-
tion: equity could only operate on conditions caused by the initial seg-
regative acts. 302
We can see a parallel in Dowell and Freeman, which involved the
termination of desegregation remedies, to the early cases of Green and
Swann, involving the adequacy of proposed remedies. All four of these
cases, in reviewing and creating remedial standards, looked to the
original interests that informed the Court's initial determination of
the unconstitutionality of school segregation in Brown I. These pairs
of cases are parallel because they were among the first cases that took
up a particular remedial problem. Green and Swann were decided by
the Supreme Court in 1968 and 1971 respectively, and were among
the Court's first opportunities to define the scope of desegregation
remedies. Dowell and Freeman were decided in 1991 and 1992 respec-
tively, and were the first termination cases to reach the Court. In
both pairs the Court understood the need to go back to basics, as it
were, when creating a new remedial standard.
Yet after Freeman and Dowell, just as after Green and Swann, the
Court decided that by defining the remedial standard in terms of in-
terests and drawing upon the breadth of equity, it had given too much
discretion to district courts to create remedies which, in the Court's
view, were unwieldy and potentially limitless. Thus, the reaction was
similar: to invoke the limits of equity to create some boundaries for
the remedies, and to create some hope for their eventual termination.
So, just as the Court's doctrine in Milliken I can be viewed as a severe
limitation on the remedies allowed by the rights focus and broad re-
medial powers outlined in Green and Swann, so can Jenkins III be
viewed as a limitation on the demanding termination standard set
forth by the Court in Dowell and Freeman. In Milliken I, the Court
held that because the scope of the violation determines the scope of
the remedy, school districts that were not responsible for the segrega-
tion at issue in the case could not be constitutionally required to par-
ticipate in remedying that segregation. The Milliken I Court reached
this result by focusing its analysis on the breach of the duty and the
agency responsible for that breach rather than on the effects of that
breach on the rights of the plaintiffs. In Jenkins III, the Court again
shifted from its rights focus of Dowell and Freeman to a duty focus,
holding that it was impermissible to require a school district to pro-
vide certain remedies with the avowed goal of attracting children from
other school districts as a method of achieving desegregation because,
302. Id. at 487-88; see also id. at 495-96 ("The vestiges of segregation that are the
concern of the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless
they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being
remedied.").
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like Milliken I, that was an interdistrict goal for an intradistrict
violation.
There are many explanations for why the Court shifted the focus in
its termination of supervision cases away from the rights and back to
the duty. One scholar has called it the "We've Done Enough" theory of
school desegregation cases. 30 3 There may be political, administrative,
moral, and legal reasons for the Court's shift. Whatever theory one
adheres to, however, the ability of the Court to change course in school
desegregation cases is at least in part attributable to the fact that the
Court has refused to carry through on the theory of rights that ini-
tially generated its desegregation jurisprudence. To the extent that
the Court has been explicit about such a theory, it seems to have
adopted the Interest Theory. It justified its initial decision in Brown I
using such a theory.
If in fact de jure segregation is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause because of the interests of school children at stake, then the
only way that the Court's jurisprudence can make sense is if the anal-
ysis remains focused on those interests. 30 4 But this does not mean
that the federal courts will be running state school districts into the
next millennium. Were the Court to acknowledge the Interest Theory
and create its termination jurisprudence by focusing on protection of
the plaintiffs' interests in educational opportunity and freedom from
racial stigma, the breadth and longevity of desegregation remedies
would be tempered by some very difficult empirical questions. An
analysis of Justice Marshall's dissent in Dowell highlights some of
these difficulties.
As he did in his Milliken I dissent, in Dowell, Justice Marshall fo-
cused on the plaintiffs' interests and argued that a desegregation de-
cree could not be lifted "so long as conditions likely to inflict the
stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I persist and there remain feasi-
ble methods of eliminating such conditions."30 5 Marshall contended
that the key to Brown was that one-race schools produced stigma and
so if a remedy had the potential to eliminate one-race schools, then it
should not be terminated. But Marshall offers up no evidence that
one-race schools per se inflict stigma. In fact, in addition to Justice
Thomas, there is a growing group of scholars and writers who argue
that one-race schools might benefit African-American children, imbu-
303. Mark V. Tushnet, The "We've Done Enough" Theory of School Desegregation, 39
How. L.J. 767 (1996).
304. But see Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of
Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 566 (1999) (arguing that the notion of
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable is not a legally
definable standard and will therefore not work as a standard to measure the ex-
pected outcome). Parker suggests instead that the remedy be prospective. Id.
305. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ing them with racial pride and self-sufficiency. 3O6 Whether or not one-
race schools create stigma is a quasi-empirical question which cannot
reasonably be assumed with the assurance and alacrity with which it
was assumed in 1954, when the cause and the message of intentional
segregation was absolutely clear.
In fact, Marshall's dissent subtly acknowledges the complexity of
the stigma issue in one passage where he reiterates the connection
between the remedial requirement of integration and stigma, arguing
that "the reemergence of racial separation in ... schools may revive
the message of racial inferiority implicit in the former policy of state-
enforced segregation."30 7 Yet to support this statement, he quotes not
studies that demonstrate stigma results from racial separation, but
studies indicating that that schools attended predominantly by racial
minorities have drastically inferior facilities, course offerings, and ex-
tracurricular programs when compared to predominantly majority
(white) schools.308 Thus, Marshall himself ties stigma more to lack of
funding and educational opportunity than to racial isolation. That is,
the message of inferiority to which Brown I referred is now conveyed
not by de jure racial segregation, but by unequal funding and distribu-
tion of goods. Whether or not this could or should be solved by contin-
ual efforts at racial balance and integration is an open question, even
after one acknowledges that the unequal distribution of goods and the
stigma that accompanies it should be considered a vestige of
segregation.
V. CONCLUSION
[A]ll law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a univer-
sal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is neces-
sary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the
usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none
the less correct; for the error is not in the law, not in the legislator, but in the
nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the
start .... Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not
better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the ab-
soluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correc-
tion of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the
306. Kevin Brown, The Legal Rhetorical Structure for the Conversion of Desegregation
Lawsuits to Quality Education Lawsuits, 42 EMORY L.J. 791, 817-18 (1993); Drew
S. Days, III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 53 (1992); Joel B. Teitelbaum, Comment, Issues in School Desegregation:
The Dissolution of a Well-Intentioned Mandate, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 347, 370-71
n.161 (1995).
307. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 260 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
308. Id. at 260 n.5.
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reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is
impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed.
-Aristotle 3 0 9
The Court's implicit acceptance of the Hohfeldian explanation of
the correlativity of rights and duties, coupled with its failure to articu-
late a theory of rights to accompany that acceptance, has created a
complicated and confused desegregation jurisprudence. The confu-
sion stems from the fact that the identification of intentional discrimi-
nation in school assignments centers primarily on tracing racial
imbalance within a school district back to before 1954 when segrega-
tion was legal. The Court has always acknowledged that to remedy
that violation, the school district must do more than simply stop dis-
criminating, yet it has never been able to identify the appropriate
scope of the remedy beyond simply inventing terms of art to approxi-
mate the intuition that something beyond ceasing to discriminate is
required.3 1o The Court has stated that the defendants must also in
some way remedy the effects of segregation by attempting to place the
plaintiffs in the position they would have been in absent the discrimi-
nation; by eliminating the vestiges of segregation to the extent practi-
cable; or by creating a unitary school district. Yet the Court has been
at a loss to explain what those vestiges are, and has declined to define
what it means by "unitary."31 1 Without a recognition of the interests
underlying the duty not to deny equal protection and its correlative
right, the lower federal courts remain open to the charge that they are
going beyond their equitable powers because they do not have a refer-
ence point for creating, approving, and terminating remedies.
There are a few conclusions to be drawn from the application of
Interest Theory to the Supreme Court's desegregation jurisprudence.
First, the Interest Theory does seem to be generally descriptive of how
the Court conceives of the right to equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Brown I, the Court grounded its holding that
intentional racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional
by doing an interest analysis of the right to equal protection. But,
consistent with this analysis, the Court has also recognized competing
interests, most particularly the community's interest in local control
over the schools. As Raz and Waldron point out, although rights and
duties are correlative, there is not an exact correlativity between par-
ticular rights and particular duties. Rather, the interests must be
used as a reference point for the creation of duties, taking into account
309. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1729, 1795-96 (David Ross trans., revised by J. Urmson, Jonathan Barnes ed.,
1984), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.5.v.html.
310. See Lawrence, supra note 246, at 50-56.
311. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246.
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competing interests.3 12 Thus, in creating duties, the interests of the
right holder must be weighed against other interests. Yet, there is
significance to the fact that the plaintiffs' interests have been elevated
to the status of a right by the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas many
of the competing interests, such as the interest in local autonomy over
school districts, have not been so elevated.313 The Court's refusal
since Brown to explore the ramifications of these competing interests
has prevented it from being able to articulate a coherent
jurisprudence.
Second, the interest analysis may allow us to move away from the
causation problem that has occupied the Court and scholars, namely
the question of whether the original intentional segregation proxi-
mately caused the current inequality in educational opportunity and
the existence of stigma. If the Court were to identify explicitly the
relevant interests that are intended to be protected by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, as it did in Brown I, and then make the causation pre-
sumption, it could shift its focus to the remedy and ask what remedies
would protect the plaintiffs' interests. The focus would shift to the
question of what remedial duties will address those interests. Such an
analysis would leave the plaintiffs with a high burden of causation,
but it would be focused not on past injustices but on future solutions.
Third, the interest analysis also broadens the remedial focus be-
yond racial mixing to explicitly take into account the interests of the
plaintiff-victims of past intentional racial segregation. It may be that
active racial desegregation/integration after intentional segregation
has ceased serves the interests of the plaintiffs in restoring their right
to equal protection, in which case racial balance would be the key to
termination decisions. But the interest analysis forces us to confront
the fact that racial mixing serves as a proxy for those interests and
that creating educational opportunity in schools where black students
are not made to feel inferior to their white counterparts-whether
those counterparts are sitting next to them or in another school-are
the primary interests that underlie the right to equal protection.
Through the Interest Theory of rights, one can see the constitutional
dimension to the more recent shift toward plaintiffs requesting reme-
dies that address education and funding concerns for minority stu-
dents and away from racial balance remedies. 3 14 Once harm to these
interests is presumed by the existence of past intentional discrimina-
312. See id.; Lawrence, supra note 246.
313. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the de Facto Abandonment of
Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597, 678 (1996) (arguing that
the text of the Equal Protection Clause itself justifies the impingement on feder-
alism that desegregation remedies create).
314. See Leland Ware, Foreword: School Desegregation, Civil Rights, and the Supreme
Court's 1994-1995 Term, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995).
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tion, the analysis should shift to how to restore these interests: It is an
open question, not yet explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court, how
best to do this.
This question, whether a certain fact can be considered a "vestige
of discrimination" because it continues to promote the feeling among
African-American children that they are not being treated respectfully
by the State, could be approached in a way analogous to how courts
evaluate other debates about issues of similar abstraction. A momen-
tary digression will clarify this point.
To succeed in a Title VII sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must
show that a "hostile environment" exists. In Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc.,3 15 the Supreme Court held that in order to state a claim for
hostile environment, the plaintiff did not have to show that she suf-
fered "concrete psychological harm," but rather, that "the environment
would reasonably be perceived and is perceived as hostile or abu-
sive."3 16 Thus, the pertinent question is whether a reasonable person
would find, and whether this plaintiff did find, that the environment
was hostile or abusive. 31 7 Courts look to a variety of factors in making
this determination, including, as Justice Scalia has stated, "[ciommon
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context."
3 18
By analogy, the only way to evaluate Justice Thomas' claim that it
is racist to assume that all-black schools are inferior is to do so in light
of the interests that the Supreme Court has identified as relevant to
the inquiry. That might mean exploring whether the one-race status
of these schools is reasonably perceived by those children as a signal of
inferiority or lack of respect. The question of how to define reasona-
bleness (i.e., do we ask about the reasonable child or the reasonable
African-American child), is analogous to the "reasonable person" ver-
sus "reasonable woman" issue in sexual harassment law.3 19 The point
is that it should be recognized as a key question.
3 20
315. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
316. Id. at 22; accord Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998).
317. As to this standard, there is also debate about whether the standard should be
that of a "reasonable person" or a "reasonable woman." Whichever is used, the
standard is an objective one that asks whether the plaintiffs perception that the
work environment is hostile or abusive is reasonable. See Naomi R. Cahn, The
Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in
Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992); Robert Unikel, "Reasonable" Doubts: A
Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 326 (1992).
318. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp.
1552, 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (making a distinction, based on the testimony, be-
tween severe conduct and mere "banter").
319. See supra note 317.
320. Interestingly, in Brown I, the Supreme Court seemed to employ a quasi-subjec-
tive standard, stating that "[t]o separate them from others of similar age and
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There has been some research in this area. Many have contended
that the feeling of disrespect that existed during segregation can be
eliminated more effectively through educational equity than racial
mixing.32 1 If this could be demonstrated, then a remedy might in-
volve improving schools while monitoring the plaintiffs' affective
functioning.
Finally, by keeping the focus on the interests of the plaintiffs, stan-
dards of success emerge that are more concrete than anything pro-
posed by the Court to date. An explicit recognition that unequal
educational opportunity and stigma are the wrongs to be corrected
provides the parties and the court with a qualitative standard for de-
veloping remedies and measuring success. Moreover, the standard is
the same, whether the court is creating a remedy, or measuring its
success. The courts could begin to figure out whether, for example,
test scores are an adequate measure of educational opportunity,
rather than focusing on the unanswerable question of how much re-
duction in achievement was caused by segregation. 32 2 The type of evi-
dence required to determine the former is no less subjective and
"sociological" than the evidence required to determine the latter.
A more honest and analytically coherent jurisprudence is the first
step toward the exercise of more principled discretion in school deseg-
regation cases. The interests that ground the plaintiffs' right to equal
protection, once made explicit, would serve as limits on the judge's
discretion at the remedy creation stage. That is, all aspects of the
remedy would have to be justified by an explanation of how well they
promote the interests harmed by the defendants' conduct. In this way,
the hardening of equitable discretion in school desegregation could
proceed, thus initiating the historical progression that has always jus-
tified and limited this discretion.
These issues remain vital despite the current absence of inten-
tional school segregation because the Court has said that vestiges of
discrimination must be eliminated before active school desegregation
efforts can be terminated.323 Presumably, if either of these effects
were demonstrated in the context of a case, a prima facie case of re-
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. at 494.
321. See CHARLES VERT WILLIE, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT WORK, 41-54(1984); Barbara A. Sizemore, Educational Research and Desegregation: Signifi-
cance for the Black Community, J. NEGRO EDUC. 66-67 (1978).
322. See Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (requiring the dis-
trict court to make a determination of the "the incremental effect that segrega-
tion has had on minority student achievement").
323. See Parker, supra note 304, at 526 (arguing that "the right-remedy connection,
with its presumption of legally compelled remedies, has [since 1991] an even
stronger reach in determining the remedy").
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maining vestiges of segregation would be shown and termination
would be inappropriate. 32 4 Thus, Justice Thomas might be correct in
arguing that all black schools are not a vestige of discrimination and
may in fact be beneficial, but that is a proposition that can and must
be tested in light of the Court's own desegregation jurisprudence. As
the Court stated in Brown I:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was writ-
ten. We must consider public education in the light of its full development
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this
way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plain-
tiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
3 2 5
This attempt to take seriously the Court's own standards for deseg-
regation remedies will certainly be met with resistance from both
sides of the debate. A few commentators have already argued that
there is no need to attempt reconciliation between the nature of the
right and the remedy. Owen Fiss, for example, argues that judges
enter the world of politics upon reaching the remedial stage of institu-
tional reform litigation and that in order to do this effectively, the
judge must put aside her preconceived notions about what Fiss calls
the "tailoring principle," by which he means "the insistence that the
remedy must fit the violation."3 26 The tailoring principle, Fiss argues,
is inadequate because it too severely limits the remedial possibilities.
But rather than telling us how we are to know, in the absence of the
tailoring principle, what the remedy is supposed to cure, Fiss falls
back on the notion of constitutional values. Yet he derives those val-
ues from his interpretation of the right at stake.
Thus, Fiss, despite his claims to the contrary, does not abandon the
right, but instead calls it a constitutional value; and thereby, he
claims, increases the types of remedies that might be appropriate.
The tailoring principle also obscures the criteria of choice in suggesting that
the violation will be the exclusive source of the remedy: it suggests that the
shape of the remedy is exclusively a function of the definition of the violation.
The overriding mission of the structural decree is to remove the threat posed
to constitutional values by the organization, but there are additional or sub-
sidiary considerations-largely embraced within the traditional concept of"eq-
uitable discretion"-that play a critical role in the remedial process .... One
set of subsidiary considerations might be considered normative: they express
values other than the one that occasions the intervention. For example, a
school decree might be predicated on a desire to eliminate a threat to racial
324. See Bd of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991) (noting that unitary status
depends on whether the vestiges of discrimination have be eliminated "to the ex-
tent practicable").
325. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
326. Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 46 (1979); see
also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1281, 1293-94 (1976).
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equality, but other values-such as respect for state autonomy, evenhanded-
ness, or a minimization of coercion-should be considered. 3 2 7
But this is exactly what the Interest Theory of rights accomplishes.
Fiss, by claiming he is abandoning the right-remedy nexus, opens
himself up to the objection that judges thereby become free-wheeling
promoters of desirable social policy. Putting the focus of remedial lim-
itations on the nature of the right, and defining that right as a reflec-
tion of important interests, centers the inquiry in a way that the more
generalized notion of constitutional values cannot. The Interest The-
ory points to one of the places where limitations might be found: in the
right at stake. Although this does not itself solve the problem of lim-
its, because we still must contend with what Waldron has called the
"waves of duties" that interests generate, 3 28 the project of analyzing
those interests and asking hard questions about their scope and impli-
cations is something clearly within the province of judicial expertise.
The notion of constitutional values is not helpful because it does not
give judges a useful focus. Perhaps the difference is just one of per-
spective; whereas I am contending that rights can serve as limita-
tions, Fiss understands rights to be indeterminate licenses from which
judges can learn little about the limits on their discretion.
Rights serve as limitations by narrowing judicial discretion to the
particular harm. Rights analysis focuses the nature of the proof and
focuses the scope of the remedy. In order for rights theory to serve as
a limitation on judicial discretion, judges must be willing to ask the
hard questions about the nature of the constitutional rights at stake.
The Interest Theory of rights is an accessible and effective method of
approaching that question.
The pressing question for anyone who has read up to this point,
must be, is any of this relevant anymore? After Jenkins III, countless
writers, scholars, and journalists have been forecasting, for better or
worse, the end of desegregation.329 District courts have responded by
terminating longstanding desegregation orders.330 The newest wave
of lawsuits in this area are aimed at undoing voluntary desegregation
techniques under the rubric of illegal affirmative action. There are
lawsuits in various states, brought by white parents whose children
were unable to attend the public school of their choice because that
school was using race as a factor in admissions in order to desegregate
and/or diversify. 3 31 The lines that separate desegregation from inte-
gration from diversity, if there ever were such lines, are blurring.
327. Fiss, supra note 326, at 48-49.
328. See Waldron, supra note 220, at 212.
329. See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 313, at 599.
330. See, e.g., Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (lst Cir. 1987); Capacchione v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Sch. Dist., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
331. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Eisenberg
ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999),
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Yet, these are exactly the reasons why the analysis presented here
still has relevance. There are no clear standards for determining
when desegregation has been accomplished and when a decree can be
terminated because there were no clear standards for ordering these
decrees in the first place. It is impossible to set standards for termina-
tion of an order if there is no understanding of what was supposed to
be accomplished by that order and the way in which that order was
carried out in the school. This involves knowing what was supposed to
be accomplished by the remedy, and whether the remedy achieved its
goals.
The termination cases are the most recent reminder that judges
have little guidance for judging the lingering effects of discrimination
and whether they have been eliminated. Instead, they substitute
other factors, such as the good faith of the school district, the degree of
racial balancing, and sometimes the extent to which the problems
with physical plants have been improved. If the legitimacy of judicial
action lies in the logical justification of its results, then the focus must
shift to providing this justification. This has become more urgent as
the Supreme Court has refined its affirmative action jurisprudence,
requiring that the factual findings upon which a state government ba-
ses its claim that the use of racial classifications is remedial be very
specific and that the use of racial classifications be narrowly tailored
to remedy the effects of that discrimination. 3 32 Unlike in the typical
affirmative actions case, where the Court reviews racial classifications
to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race,"33 3 the understanding that
racial classifications in the aftermath of school segregation are in fact
remedial was the Court's own claim throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
The necessity of this is brought home by Belk, described in Part I of
this Article. In that case, the court made clear that once the unitary
status of a school district is judicially determined, then attempts at
racial balance, diversity, or any other result that requires any race
consciousness, will be subject to strict scrutiny, which is usually,
"strict in theory but fatal in fact."334 The bright line drawn by the
Court in Belk, between districts vulnerable to claims of illegal affirma-
tive action and districts not so vulnerable because their unitary status
has not been judicially determined, is an implicit recognition that the
central issue remains the elusive definition of unitary status.
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2001); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.
1998); see also Tamar Lewin, School Desegregation Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2002, at A8 (describing case brought by white parents challenging volun-
tary desegregation policy).
332. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
333. Id. at 721.
334. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
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A theory about how the Supreme Court ought to analyze desegre-
gation cases will not be a panacea for the difficulties endemic to school
desegregation. Yet, it is also true that the case-by-case approach and
the almost complete absence of theoretical underpinning for the Su-
preme Court's desegregation jurisprudence prevents a clarification of
the practical issues involved. This Article suggests a more focused
and productive approach to those practical issues.
The final outcome of the massive social experiment that began
with Brown, now depends, as it always has, on the definition of a "ves-
tige of discrimination," which can only be properly addressed by re-
turning to first principles. And those principles must be addressed
separately and apart from the current affirmative action debate.335
Perhaps a discussion of the theoretical premises underlying desegre-
gation was not as necessary forty-eight years ago when the violation,
its meaning, and its effects, were so transparent, but it appears to be
necessary now.
335. See Kevin Brown, Equal Protection Challenges to the Use of Racial Classifications
to Promote Integrated Public Elementary and Secondary Student Enrollments, 34
AKRON L. REV. 37 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court should use its educa-
tion jurisprudence, not its equal protection jurisprudence, to analyze racial classi-
fications in the context of public schools).
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